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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: ADDRESSING THE REAL
WORLD OF RACIAL INJUSTICE IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
DONNA COKER*
Reading Supreme Court decisions in criminal cases often feels like
falling down the rabbit hole:1 a bizarre adventure where nothing is what the
Court says it is and circular reasoning passes for analysis. In the Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, "there is a tendency ... to pretend that
the world we all know is not the world in which law enforcement
operates." '2 This is a "raceless world... a constructed reality in which most
police officers do not act on the basis of considerations of race, the facts
underlying a search or seizure can be evaluated without examining the
influence of race, and the applicable constitutional mandate is wholly
unconcerned with race." 3 It is a world in which abuse of power by law
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Colleagues and friends Marc
Fajer and Martha Mahoney provided useful comments and insights for which I am very
grateful. Charles Lanzdorf, Ana Prentice, David Gottlieb, and Natalie Barefoot provided
able research assistance. Sonia Ramos, Sue Anne Campbell, and Barbara Cuadras provided
administrative and librarian assistance. I am grateful for their support.
1 See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND Chapter One (Broadview
Press Ltd. 2000). Down the Rabbit Hole begins Alice's bizarre adventures when she follows
a white rabbit down the hole to a place where nothing is what it seems and nonsense can cost
you your head. Id.
2 Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial Integrity,
40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 133 (2003). The author continues:
[w]hether the Court is out of touch with the world in which most people live or is blinking and
winking to aid law enforcement probably does not matter. Decisions that do not correspond to
the world in which most people live threaten to undermine the integrity of the judicial system.
Id. at 134.
3 Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 962 (1999). "[T]hroughout its existence, the Rehnquist Court has
consistently ruled against criminal defendants and in favor of the government." Erwin
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enforcement 4 and prosecutors 5 is rare and individuals, without regard to
their location in the racial hierarchy, are presumed to know that they may
refuse a police officer's search request 6 without dire consequences.
The Court's application of Equal Protection jurisprudence to criminal
cases is similarly divorced from reality. As a number of scholars have
noted, the Court's decision in Whren v. United States7 divorces Equal
Protection analysis from the Fourth Amendment's control on police
discretion.8  Further, when law enforcement officers use express
distinctions based on racial categories, rather than apply the strict scrutiny
Chemerinksy, Understanding the Rehnquist Court: An Admiring Reply to Professor Merrill,
47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 659, 660 (2003).
4 For example, in a Supreme Court case involving a full arrest based on a traffic violation
for which incarceration was not a penalty, Justice Souter concluded that the problem of
police overkill cannot be that bad because "the country is not confronting anything like an
epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests." Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S.
318, 354 (2001) (concluding that "the probable-cause standard applies to all arrests, without
the need to balance the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations"). As
Stephen Saltzburg writes, "There well may be no epidemic of these cases, or at least not one
that the Justices will see. These stops, arrests and searches will be of the young, of
minorities and of many others who often will consent to a search as part of a stop."
Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 157.
5 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-64 (1996) (noting that prosecutors
retain broad discretion and "in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume
that they have properly discharged their official duties" (quoting United States v. Chemical
Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926))).
6 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
permits officers to approach bus passengers at random to ask questions and request their
consent to searches, provided a reasonable person would feel free to decline the requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (holding
that bus passengers were not "seized" when law enforcement officers stood near the exit and
the front entrance of the bus and a third officer leaned near a passenger and requested to
search the individual's bags and person). The race of the defendants in Bostick and Drayton
is not mentioned by the Court presumably because it is deemed irrelevant. See Albert W.
Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163 (discussing the
Court's decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) that bifurcates Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence from Equal Protection and ignores defendants claims that they
were singled out because of their race); Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment
Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2283 (2002)
("African-American, Hispanic-American, or Asian-American communities might on average
have different notions from the white community about whether an encounter with the police
is voluntary or not.").
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 39-40 (1999); see generally Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops,
5 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and
the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SuP. CT. REV. 271, 326-29.
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that would apply in other settings,9 the Court has applied a reasonable
suspicion test or less.10 Finally, as reiterated in the 2002-03 term decision
in United States v. Bass," in those cases where the defendant seeks to
demonstrate that despite a facially neutral category, the prosecutor brought
charges or pursued heavier penalties because of his or her race, the Court's
requirements make the defendant's burden of proof all but impossible to
meet.
In this article I address the "real world" of criminal law enforcement.
In the first section, I describe some of the overwhelming empirical evidence
demonstrating unjust and unequal treatment in the criminal justice system
of African Americans and, to a lesser extent, Latinos. Much of this
injustice occurs as a result of America's drug enforcement policies. These
policies provide the rationale for police to stop, search, and arrest, and for
courts to incarcerate, disproportionate numbers of African American men
and women. Drug enforcement policies are also the justification given by
Attorney General John Ashcroft's Justice Department for the unequal
number of African Americans charged with federal death penalty eligible
crimes.
In the second section I describe the Supreme Court's response to
claims of selective prosecution, that is, to claims that prosecutors sought
tougher punishments for African Americans because of their race. The
Supreme Court's discovery rule in United States v. Armstrong,12 reiterated
again this term in Bass,13 made it practically impossible for defendants to
prevail on selective prosecution claims. The Court set the standard for
discovery very high: defendants must proffer evidence that "similarly
situated" whites were treated more favorably.' 4 The Court's intent-based
jurisprudence forms the familiar obstacles to claims of discrimination, but
the Court's deference to prosecutors embodied in its discovery ruling in
these cases makes it much more difficult to make a selective prosecution
9 For a discussion of such cases, see Alschuler, supra note 6.
10 See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 193-94 (describing the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (concluding that border detentions
based on ethnic appearance "were so brief and unintrusive that 'reasonable suspicion' was
unnecessary to justify them")); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562 ("[T]he resulting intrusion
on the interests of motorists [is] minimal[,] ... the purpose of the stops is legitimate and in
the public interest[,] ... and the need is demonstrated .... Accordingly, we hold that the
stops and questioning at issue may be made in the absence of any individualized suspicion
.... .).
' 536 U.S. 862 (2002).
12 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
"3 536 U.S. at 862.
14 Bass, 536 U.S. at 862; Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
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claim than to bring claims of intentional discrimination in other contexts.
The "similarly situated" data may not exist or the prosecutor may have
exclusive access to the required data. In addition, the "similarly situated"
standard is a wholly indeterminate standard. Courts that are hostile to
selective prosecution claims can always find white comparators dissimilar.
In the third section I discuss the most prominent government rationale
for race disparities in federal drug enforcement arrests and incarceration:
that federal agents are focusing on violent street gangs engaged in large-
scale drug trafficking and these gangs are predominantly African American
in membership. This explanation also figures prominently in Attorney
General Ashcroft's explanation of racial disparities in the federal death
penalty system. 15 The validity of the government's empirical claim is
undermined by research that finds that most drug offenders incarcerated in
federal prisons are non-violent offenders and most are not affiliated with a
criminal organization. In this section I also examine current Justice
Department research regarding the causes of racial disparities in the federal
death penalty system. I conclude that this research is too narrow in scope to
provide the data most needed to test the government's empirical claims
regarding drug offending.
The argument that African Americans are overrepresented in drug
charging in federal court because they are disproportionately members of
violent street gangs engaged in high volume trafficking demonstrates the
ease with which the government can defeat a defendant's claim that
"similarly situated" whites were treated more favorably. There is no
empirical data that would prove the government's claim and the data that
does exist suggests that the claim may be inaccurate. But for the defendant
who must proffer evidence of white violent gang members not similarly
prosecuted in federal court, the burden is nearly impossible to meet.
In the final section, I examine the potential for change in the racial
operation of the criminal justice system. I argue that changes in social
perceptions of crime and criminal offending have the potential to result in
legislative and policy changes. Such changes require organizing in
communities of color, but also require challenges to white thinking about
crime. I identify three major obstacles to changes in white perceptions.
First are deeply embedded racist stereotypes of black criminality and
dangerousness in white perceptions of crime. Second, whites tend to
understand race discrimination to mean intentional acts of a bigoted actor.
This framework focuses debate on the motives of law enforcement
personnel, rather than on systemic racial injustice. Third, whites are seldom
15 See infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
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aware of the degree to which white privilege protects them from police
suspicion and surveillance. The invisibility of white privilege (to whites)
encourages them to presume that system maltreatment is, in some part, the
fault of the victim of such maltreatment. Finally, I examine the growing
Innocence Movement for its potential to be a vehicle for challenging these
aspects of white support for, or complacency regarding, racial disparities in
the criminal justice system.
I. THE REAL WORLD: THE IMPACT OF THE OPERATION OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM ON THE LIVES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN INDIVIDUALS
In the domestic violence field, in which I do most of my work, we are
plagued with a lack of data, particularly data on the effects of criminal
justice system intervention in the lives of men, women, and children who
are marginalized as a result of race, class, or immigrant status.16 In contrast,
a plethora of research demonstrates the overall negative impact of current
drug enforcement policies on the lives of people of color who reside in poor
inner city neighborhoods. 7 These policies harm both those who engage in
criminal behavior as well as those who do not.
For several years official incarceration data told the shocking truth:
though African Americans make up about twelve percent of the national
population, 8 they represent close to half of those who are incarcerated for
crimes.19 An estimated twelve percent of African American men ages
twenty to thirty-four were either in jail or prison in 2002.20 This compares
16 See, e.g., Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material
Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1009, 1028-29 (2000)
[hereinafter Coker, Shifting Power] (describing the lack of research regarding the
experiences of Latinas and other women of color including those of domestic violence and
the corresponding lack of information regarding the impact of law reform on the same);
Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law Reform:
A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 809-10 (2001) [hereinafter Coker, Crime
Control] ("Despite evidence of disproportionate effects [of criminal intervention for
domestic violence], little research has examined the impact of mandatory policies in low-
income African American and Latino communities.").
17 See infra notes 22-31 (describing disproportionate arrests, traffic stops, and
incarceration resulting in harms to individuals, neighborhoods, and families).
18 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS 2000, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-tl/tabOI/txt (internet release date April 2,
2001).
19 PAIGE M. HARRISON & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2002, at 5 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/pjim02.pdf.
20 Id. At year end 2001, African American males in this age range represented about ten
percent of the prison population. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2001, at 12 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
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to just 1.6% of white men in the same age group.2' Researchers with the
Bureau of Justice Statistics estimate that twenty-eight percent of African
American males will be jailed or imprisoned at some point in their life.22 A
study conducted by the Sentencing Project reports that nearly one in three
(32.2%) African American men between the ages of twenty and twenty-
nine are under the supervision of the criminal justice system on any given
day.
23
The "War on Drugs" policies that focus on supply-side enforcement
against low-level dealers in inner city areas account for a significant amount
of this racial disparity. 24 In federal prison, the federal 100-to-1 sentencing
disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine,25 coupled with a
federal law enforcement focus on crack offenses, 6 also plays a significant
role in creating the disparity.
pdf/pO l.pdf.
21 HARRISON & KARBERG, supra note 19, at 5.
22 Fox Butterfield, Prison Rates Among Blacks Reach A Peak, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES
Apr. 7, 2003, at A12 (quoting Allen J. Beck, chief prison demographer for the Bureau of
Justice Statistics).
23 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT SUMMARY: YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER (2001), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/9070smy.pdf. Incarceration rates continue to climb.
See HARRISON & KARBERG, supra note 19, at 13.
24 See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations
Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 743 (1993) [hereinafter Blumstein, Racial
Disproportionality]; Alfred Blumstein, Incarceration Trends, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
95 (2000) [hereinafter Blumstein, Incarceration Trends]. See generally MICHAEL TONRY,
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); Tracey L. Meares,
Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 396-97 (2000) [hereinafter
Meares, Norms]; Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New
York City Neighborhoods, FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2003), Paper No. 03-54,
Columbia Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/cfdev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per id= 197394.
25 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING, at iv-v (2002) ("[Federal] sentencing guideline range based solely on drug
quantity is three to over six times longer for crack cocaine offenders with equivalent drug
quantities .. . [as a result] in 2000 the average sentence for a crack offense was 44 months
longer than the average sentence for a powder cocaine offense, 118 months compared to 74
months."). The majority of federal and state drug offenders are incarcerated on cocaine
related charges. Eric L. Sevigny & Jonathan P. Caulkins, Kingpins or Mules: An Analysis of
Drug Offenders Incarcerated in Federal and State Prisons (manuscript on file with author).
The authors analyze the findings of the Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional
Facilities, 1997, a nationally representative survey of federal and state inmates conducted
regularly by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Id. The 1997 survey is the most currently
available in a series. Id.
26 See, e.g., Laurence A. Benner, Racial Disparity in Narcotics Search Warrants, 6 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 183, 197-98 (2002). A study of drug warrants issued in San Diego
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Despite higher rates of incarceration for drug offenses, data suggests
that African Americans do not use drugs any more than do whites. 27 The
2001 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse found rates of illicit drug
use to be 7.4% among African Americans, 7.2% among whites, and 6.4%
among Hispanics. 28 Yet African Americans represent more than 57% 29of
those incarcerated for drug offenses in state prisons.
This disproportionate incarceration is not confined to African
American men. The number of incarcerated African American women has
also risen sharply, again primarily as a result of drug enforcement policies.
30
county found that in the district which included the city of San Diego, thirty-nine percent of
the warrants were for crack cocaine and only two percent of the warrant subjects for crack
cocaine were white. Id. African Americans were fifty percent of the targets for crack
cocaine warrants and Hispanics were forty-eight percent. Id.
27 See, e.g., Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality, supra note 24; Blumstein,
Incarceration Trends, supra note 24. See generally TONRY, supra note 24. Research on
offending rates for interpersonal offenses suggests that African Americans have higher rates
of offending than do whites. Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality, supra note 24 (finding
that most of the racial disproportionality is due to differences in offending except for drug
crimes). As Katheryn K. Russell notes, the degree to which racial disproportionately can not
be explained by differences in offending is still cause for serious concern. See KATHERYN K.
RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM,
POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MICROAGGRESSIONS 31 (1998) ("By Blumstein's
calculation, the 20 to 25 percent of unexplained disparity ... represents about ten thousand
Black prisoners .... Ten thousand Blacks, who may have been treated more harshly by the
criminal justice system because of their race, constitutes an enormous social problem.").
28 See, e.g., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN. OFFICE OF APPLIED
STUDIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., 2001 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON
DRUG ABUSE: HIGHLIGHTS, at http://www.samhsa.gov/oas/nhsda/2klnhsda/vol1/
highlights.htm (last accessed n.d.) [hereinafter NHSDA]. The survey reports that 7.1% of
the U.S. population twelve years of age or older used an illicit drug during the month
immediately prior to the survey interview. Id. Marijuana is by far the most commonly used
illicit drug with fifty-six percent of the illicit drug users using only marijuana and an
additional twenty percent using marijuana and another illicit drug. Id. Cocaine was used by
about 0.7% of the U.S. population aged twelve or older and crack was used by only 0.2%.
Id. Men are more likely to report current illicit drug use than are women (8.7% versus
5.5%). Id. Among pregnant women, only 3.7% of pregnant women ages fifteen to forty-
four reported use of illicit drugs. Id. Youth and being unemployed are highly correlated with
rates of illicit drug use. While only 6.9% of fulltime employed persons reported illicit drug
use, the number was 17.1% for those who were unemployed. Id. The largest percentage of
users is found in the eighteen-twenty year old range. Id. College graduates had lower rates
of current use (4.3%) compared with those who completed only high school (7.6%), even
though those who had completed four years of college were more likely to report that they
had tried illicit drugs in their lifetime (47.2% versus 32.0%). Id.
29 HARRISON & BECK, supra note 20, at 13 tbl.17. African Americans were 145,300 of
the 251,100 state prisoners incarcerated for drug offenses in 2001. Id.
30 See Stephanie R. Bush-Baskette, The War on Drugs as a War Against Black Women,
in CRIME CONTROL AND WOMEN 113 (Susan L. Miller ed., 1998); HARRISON & BECK, supra
note 20, at 113 ("[D]rug offenders accounted for a larger portion of the growth among
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In fact, the number of women in prison is growing at a much faster rate than
is true for men,3 1 and the largest increase is in the number of African
American women.
32
The interaction of drug enforcement policies and federal mandatory
sentencing laws operate in a particularly pernicious way for African
American women charged with drug crimes. This is true because many
women convicted for drug offenses played minor roles in drug transactions
for which their intimate (or former intimate) partner was a major player.33
Mandatory sentencing eliminated whatever leniency might have been
afforded such women.34 In an ironic twist, because these women are such
low-level players, they are often unable to provide useful information in
exchange for the prosecutor's recommendation for a reduced sentence.35
The result, as Phyllis Goldfarb describes, is that they end up with longer
sentences than their more culpable male co-conspirators.36
In addition to the same enforcement policies that result in
disproportionately higher numbers of incarcerated African American men,
the number of incarcerated African American women may be worsened by
the failure of courts to recognize the impact of domestic violence in these
cases. 37  Duress doctrine does not usually apply to the circumstances of
battered women coerced into drug offenses, and courts are often unwilling
to recognize their coercion in determining sentencing.38 As Peter Margulies
female inmates (33%) [from 1990 to 2000], compared to 19% among male offenders.").
3 HARRISON & KARBERG, supra note 19, at 5 ("[S]ince 1995 the annual rate of growth in
the number of female inmates has averaged 5.4% higher than the 3.6% average increase in
male inmates.").
32 Id. at 13 ("Black females.., were 2.5 times more likely than Hispanic females ... and
five times more likely than white females.., to be incarcerated in 2002.").
33 See Phyllis Goldfarb, Counting the Drug War's Female Casualties, 6 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST 277 (2002). Conspiracy law, with its weak actus reus requirements, makes it
particularly easy for these women to be convicted of charges involving drug related
conspiracies. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 29.01 (3d ed. 2001).
Because conspiracy law de-emphasizes conduct, there is a greater risk that persons will be
punished for associating with others who are culpable. Id.
34 See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women,
and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905 (1993).
35 Goldfarb, supra note 33, at 294.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 283 (describing the case of Kemba Smith, battered by her drug dealing
boyfriend, was sentenced to 24.5 years on drug charges; President Clinton commuted her
sentence).
38 See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Battered Bargaining: Domestic Violence and Plea
Negotiations in the Criminal Justice System, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 153
(2001); Goldfarb, supra note 33, at 294; Raeder, supra note 34, at 741-42 (describing the
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describes, defense lawyers who are unaware or unsympathetic may never
learn of the abuse and prosecutors may not deem information regarding a
co-defendant's abusive behavior to be material information which must be
disclosed to the defense.3 9 This situation is likely aggravated for African
American women who are viewed by courts and juries as particularly
40
unlikely to fit the stereotype of "helpless" battered women.
The racial disparities in incarceration likely reflect differential
enforcement. Police officers are more likely to stop African Americans for
traffic stops41 and, once stopped, they are more likely to search the vehicles
of African Americans.42 For example, 2001 traffic stop data in San Diego
found that African American drivers had a sixty percent greater chance and
Hispanic drivers had a thirty-seven percent greater chance of being stopped
compared to white drivers.43 Once stopped, African American drivers were
more likely to have their vehicles searched. 4 This increased opportunity to
discover criminal offending is thought by many to be a significant reason
way in which courts have interpreted federal sentencing guidelines with regard to an
abuser's coercion of a female offender).
39 Margulies, supra note 38, at 170. Even if the abuse is exposed, courts vary in
determining what role, if any, the fact of abuse should play in either conviction or
sentencing. Some courts have been willing to grant downward departures for defendants
who can show that they were acting under the coercion of a violent partner, while other
courts have been hostile to such claims. Id. Even though federal sentencing guidelines
allow courts to shorten the sentence for those who played a "minor role" in drug offenses,
judges may become less inclined to allow such downward departures in appropriate cases
when they find that the majority of the defendants appearing before them are minor players.
As one former federal public defender told me, since all of the drug offenders in his
jurisdiction fit the description of "minor role" players, courts frequently refuse to grant
downward departures in appropriate cases. Interview with Ricardo Bascuas Associate
Professor, University of Miami School of Law, in Coral Gables, Fla. (n.d.).
40 Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bath Water, Racial Imagery and
Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis.
L. REv. 1003, 1071 (1995) (describing the way in which racist stereotypes of African
American women shape the way in which juries understand their accounts of battering).
41 See, e.g., State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (expert
testimony related study of New Jersey traffic stops finding disproportionate traffic stops of
African American motorists); Gary Cordner, et al., Vehicle Stops in San Diego: 2001, at
http://www.sannet.gov/police/pdf/stoprpt.pdf (Nov. 2002) (finding that blacks and Hispanics
had a much higher likelihood of being stopped for traffic violations than did whites: one in
four compared to one in ten).
42 Cordner et al., supra note 41, at 40 tbl.23 (finding that once stopped, blacks and
Hispanics had a much higher chance of being searched: whites had only a 4.1% chance,
blacks had a 11.1% chance, and Hispanics had 12.7% chance).
43 Id. at 2. The data is collected from forms that police officers are required to complete
each time they stop a vehicle. Id. at 1.
44 Id. at 3.
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for the disproportionate rate of arrest and incarceration of African
Americans.
Apologists of racial profiling have argued that racial profiling for
African Americans is a rational and efficient use of police resources given
that a larger percentage of them commit crimes than do other racial
groups.45  I address the differential offending data later,46 but here it is
important to note that the efficiency argument is simply inaccurate. As
Professor David Harris notes, research demonstrates just the opposite:
officers are less likely to find contraband or uncover other criminal behavior
when they use race or ethnicity as a factor in determining whom to stop and
search than if they use a non-racial focus on suspicious behavior.47 "When
stops and searches are not racialized, they are more productive.A
8
An additional way in which racial disparities in arrest and
incarceration for drug offenses are perpetuated is through the disparate use
of search warrants.49 A study of narcotics search warrants in San Diego
found racial disparities in the issuance of drug search warrants in San Diego
county.50 African Americans made up only six percent of the population,
but were the subjects of search warrants in twenty percent of the cases.
Hispanics, who made up about twenty-four percent of the population, were
search warrant subjects in forty-three percent of the cases, and whites, who
were sixty-one percent of the county's population, were subjects of search
warrants in only thirty-five percent of the cases.51 Most of the warrants
were issued in inner city majority non-white neighborhoods, but racial
disparities were true in every area of the county, even in predominantly
white areas.
52
45 See David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The
Significance of Data Collection, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71 (2003), available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/66LCPHarris (describing this commonly held view);
Benner, supra note 26, at 200 (describing a veteran officer's response to racial disparities in
a search warrant study, the officer told Benner, that they are simply "going where the work
is").
46 See discussion infra notes 172-80 and accompanying text (questioning empirical basis
of Justice Department claims that racial disparities in federal drug prosecutions are the result
of the racial makeup of drug trafficking gangs); see also infra notes 217-29 and
accompanying text (describing research regarding differential criminal offending).
47 Harris, supra note 45, at 82.
48 Id.
49 A confidential informant is "a source who's [sic] identity the police refuse to disclose
in their probable cause affidavit." Benner, supra note 26, at 200 n.60.
So Id.
5 Id. at 217.
52 Id.
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The evidence that supported the search warrants reveals differing
enforcement tactics. With the search warrants that were issued for
neighborhoods that were predominantly African American and Latino,
eighty percent relied on confidential informants. 53 This was not the case for
warrants issued in majority-white neighborhoods.54  Confidential
informants may include "drug users who have been caught and are given
incentives by police to cooperate by turning in their supplier., 55 If, as some
studies have found, drug users are more likely to purchase drugs from
dealers of the same race,56 one expects that the racial pattern of traffic stops
and searches would increase exponentially the racial disparity in search
warrants. Even if there are low rates of success, significant racial
disparities in warrant issuance will likely result in race disparities in drug
arrests and incarceration.
The study also found that search warrants for African American and
Latino subjects were far less successful at finding drugs than were search
warrants for whites. Fifty-three percent of the warrants for white subjects
were successful, while the success rates for warrants that targeted Hispanics
was thirty-six percent and twenty-eight percent for those that targeted
African Americans. 57 The racial differences remained even when the re-
searchers controlled for the type of drug. 8 It may be that, just as is true
with traffic stops and searches, courts and police officers apply a lower
threshold to the issuance of search warrants when the targets are African
Americans or when the target resides in a "high-crime" (read non-white) 59
area. This would explain why warrants targeting whites are generally more
successful than are those targeting African Americans and Latinos. It also
suggests an additional manner in which African Americans and Latinos
suffer disproportionate invasions of privacy and safety at the hands of
police.6°
3 Id. at 200.
4 Id. at 221.
I d. at 201.
56 See David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial
Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 309-10 (2001)
(reporting on drug research).
57 Benner, supra note 26, at 263.
58 More whites were targeted for methamphetamine use and '"meth labs' are more
stationary and easier to find than rock [crack] cocaine," id. at 220 n.98, but the racial effects
remained significant even when researchers controlled for warrants targeting
methamphetamines. Id. at 221.
59 See COLE, supra note 8, at 44. "[H]igh-crime" is code for inner city, predominantly
African American or Hispanic "underclass" neighborhood. Id.
60 The study author concludes:
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Racial disparities also exist in death penalty sentencing. I will focus
here on federal death penalty data, which formed the basis of Bass's
selective prosecution claim in Bass. The Department of Justice released a
survey in 2000 and a follow-up survey in 2001 that reviewed federal death
penalty cases. 6 1 For the years 1995-2000, 682 defendants were charged
with death-eligible crimes, that is crimes for which the death penalty was a
potential punishment. 62 The survey revealed the following data: of the 682
cases, the defendant was African American in forty-eight percent of the
cases, Hispanic in twenty-nine percent of the cases, and white in only
twenty percent of the cases.63 In addition, the survey found a significant
racial disparity in plea bargaining. Several defendants in whose cases the
Attorney General authorized a death penalty prosecution, subsequently
entered a plea agreement that spared them a death penalty prosecution.
64
Only twenty-five percent of African American defendants and twenty-eight
percent of Hispanic defendants entered into plea agreements, compared
with forty-eight percent of white defendants. 65 The survey noted that there
were nineteen defendants then under a federal death sentence, sixty-eight
percent of whom were African American, while only twenty-one percent
were white and five percent were Hispanic.
66
The racial disparities in federal death penalty data were in contrast to
state death penalty data. Combined state data found that fifty-five percent
of defendants awaiting execution were white and forty-three percent were
African American.
67
The racial disparities in the federal system remained when further data
was collected on cases that could have been charged with death eligible
offenses, but were not. The 2001 Survey included an additional 291 cases,
do perceptions about race unconsciously color [the probable cause] determination and make [it]
appear more readily when the suspect is Hispanic or black and lives in a 'high crime' area?...
The locations the police choose to patrol and what drugs they choose to target are largely a
function of where they perceive 'the work is.' Those decisions are not made in isolation from the
totality of our cultural beliefs, stereotypes, and perceptions.
Banner, supra note 26, at 223 (footnote omitted).
61 U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System: A Statistical Survey (1988-
2000) (Sept. 12, 2000) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dpsurvey.html
[hereinafter Survey 2000].
62 Id. at 2.
63 Id. at 6.
64 Id. at 32.
65 id.
66 Id. at 36.
67 Id. at 36 (citing Bureau of Justice statistics data).
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for a total of 973 cases.68 Of the 973 defendants who were either charged
with a death-eligible offense or whose conduct was such that they could
have been charged with a death-eligible offense, only seventeen percent
were white, while forty-two percent were African American and thirty-six
69percent were Hispanic.
The negative effects of racial disparities in arrests and incarcerations
are not limited to those visited on the searched, the arrested, or the
incarcerated. Rather, the impact is visited on the entire community. These
community effects alone provide a compelling reason to re-examine current
law enforcement policies, particularly drug enforcement policies.
When a family member is arrested, the family not only loses that
person's income,70 they also acquire additional expenses involved in
maintaining contact with the incarcerated family member.7' Incarceration
increases the burden on mothers who are left to provide for their children
without the help of fathers.7 2
Drug enforcement concentrated in poor inner city areas populated
predominantly by African Americans and other people of color means that
one of the costs of long-term incarceration is deepened social
disorganization in already troubled neighborhoods. 3 As Tracey Meares
68 U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System: Supplementary Data,
Analysis and Revised Protocols for Capital Case Review (June 6, 2001), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm [hereinafter Survey 2001].
69 Id. As I describe more fully later, the chief explanation offered by Attorney General
Ashcroft for these racial disparities was that they were the result of federal law enforcement
focus on violent gangs involved in drug trafficking. See infra notes 137-44 and
accompanying text.
70 See Ryan King, The Economics of Drug Selling: A Review of the Research, at 3 (April
2003), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org (findings of three studies on economics
of drug selling confirm that most were legitimately employed and drug sales were "a
complement to, rather than a substitute for, legitimate employment").
71 See Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, Introduction to INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 1, 3 [hereinafter INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT]. Families often cannot afford to receive calls from prison because they are
required to be collect and the rates are high; families cannot afford the transportation costs of
visiting someone in prison. Id. For examples of families whose finances were ruined in
their efforts to seek the release of a wrongfully accused family member, see BARRY SCHECK
ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT
(2001).
72 See Beth E. Richie, The Social Impact of Mass Incarceration on Women, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT, supra note 71, at 136, 144-47 ("[T]he already over-burdened role of caretaker
... is further complicated by the constant threat women face of possible arrest and detention
of a family member ... ").
73 Meares, Norms, supra note 24, at 396-97 ("The highest numbers of those caught under
this approach will tend to be street-level dealers, who are not evenly distributed throughout a
city, but who are geographically concentrated in disadvantaged, minority neighborhoods.");
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notes, "[r]emoval of these individuals in large numbers from their
communities will be associated with higher levels of joblessness, low
economic status, and family disruption, which in turn will disrupt the social
structural and cultural determinants of community-based social control.
'7 4
A recent study of the effects of New York policing underscores the nature
of these harms.7 5 The authors of the study found that incarceration in New
York was concentrated in the poorest minority neighborhoods resulting in a
cycle that deepens community disorganization and, ironically, increases
76incarceration. The prospects for legitimate employment diminish at the
individual level as businesses refuse to hire ex-inmates,77 but the impact on
employment extends to the entire neighborhood as the concentration of ex-
inmates in an area diminishes legitimate job prospects for everyone because
it "further stigmatize[s] areas and deters businesses from hiring locally or
locating in such areas., 78 The resulting "decrease in the number of adult
males [in the community] ... weakens the general social control of children
and especially adolescents" '79 as mothers try to do it all without the money
for child care and with inadequate social supports. The result is more
incarceration not only because diminished legitimate employment and
weakened control systems increase rates of offending, but also because
"high rates of incarceration invite closer and more punitive police
enforcement and parole surveillance.,
80
In addition, because there are few and inadequate services for inmates
in prison or for those who leave prison, incarceration may aggravate other
problems. For example, while a significant number of those arrested for
drug offenses report that they are drug users, addiction treatment is often
not available for the incarcerated or for the newly released ex-inmate
8 1
Tracey L. Meares, The Increasing Significance of Genes: Reproducing Race, 92 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1046, 1052 (1998) ("When traditional forms of punishment like imprisonment are
concentrated on individuals from communities that are disproportionately poor, there will be
predictable negative consequences-more broken families, higher levels of unemployment,
general reduction of community economic well-being, and other conditions that disrupt
social organization.").
74 Meares, Norms, supra note 24, at 396-97.
75 Fagan et al., supra note 24, at 26.
76 Id. at 14-15.
77 Id. at 27-28.
78 id.
" Id. at 27.
go Id. at 3. Thus, "[i]ncarceration begets more incarceration, and incarceration also
begets more crime, which in turn invites more aggressive enforcement, which then re-
supplies incarceration." Id.
81 Gwen Rubinstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing-Denial of Benefits to
Drug Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 71, at 37, 39. Drug treatment is not
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Experiences of prison violence coupled with the stresses of adjustment to
life outside of prison may increase the risk of domestic violence, but only a
few programs address this risk.
8 2
Collateral consequences of offending also negatively affect not only
the ex-felon, but the entire community. Those convicted of drug offenses
may be prevented from obtaining student financial aid,83 welfare assistance
for their children,84 or public housing.85 Felon disenfranchisement results in
a concentration of neighborhood residents who cannot vote, thus diluting
the political power of the entire neighborhood.8 6
The concentration of incarceration and drug surveillance in a
neighborhood means that residents may be less likely to seek police
assistance when it is needed. A person implicated in even a small way in
the drug offending of a family member or friend may fear police
interaction.8 7 This may be a particular problem for women. There are a
widely available in the criminal justice system and the proportion of inmates receiving
treatment has decreased. Id.
82 See The Vera Institute, Safe Return Initiative, available at http://www.vera.org/
project/projectl_l.asp?sectionid=l&project-id=27&archive = (last visited Sept. 29, 2003)
("[N]either researchers nor practitioners have paid much attention to addressing domestic
violence among African Americans as prisoners reunite with their families ...."). The Safe
Return Initiative, a program of the Vera Institute and the Institute on Domestic Violence in
the African American Community, engages in "community education, training, and on-site
assistance" to help professionals working with ex-offenders address "domestic violence
among African-Americans as prisoners reunite with their families." Id.
83 See 20 U.S.C. § 1091 (2000) (restricting financial aid eligibility for certain drug
offenses). For a list of collateral consequences, see Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on
Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
253, 259 (2002). Those convicted of a felony cannot serve on federal juries, may be
imprisoned for possession of a firearm, are ineligible for security clearance necessary for
many jobs, cannot enlist in the military, may be excluded from public housing, and may not
be eligible to be foster or adoptive parents. Id. Those convicted of a drug felony may be
denied federal benefits including education benefits, may be ineligible to participate in
federally-funded health care programs, may be ineligible to receive public assistance for
their children, may not receive federal financial aid, and are ineligible for employment in
particular federally-regulated industries. Id.
84 See 21 U.S.C. § 862a (d)(l)(A) (2000) (requiring states to opt out of drug conviction
restrictions on the receipt of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)).
85 See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2003).
86 Fagan et al., supra note 24, at 28. Approximately "3.9 million adults are permanently
disenfranchised, including 1.4 million African American men. In ten states, one-fifth or
more of African American men are permanently disenfranchised." Chin, supra note 83, at
262-63.
87 See Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 683 (1998)
("[T]he lines between law breakers and law abiders are not so clean and clear" in inner city
neighborhoods because "[m]ultiple roles are inevitable in poor, structurally weak
communities where it is not uncommon for law-abiding citizens to ... rely on law breakers
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number of reasons to believe that the ranks of drug offending women
overlap with the ranks of women experiencing domestic violence. Drug
addicted women are likely more vulnerable to physical violence;88 some
battered women report using drugs as a method of creating solidarity with
their drug abusing partner;89 some women become addicted to drugs when
they use them to manage pain from untreated physical injuries; 90 some
battered women sell drugs as a means to earn money for escape; 9 and some
women are coerced into assisting their partners' drug enterprise at the threat
of physical harm.92 Women who need police protection may not call the
police because they fear exposing their own or their partner's drug
offending.
93
Even when an individual has no involvement in illegal activity,
interaction with law enforcement can be dangerous. Those dangers may be
direct, such as the danger that police contact may result in mistreatment.
Those dangers may be indirect, such as where contact with the criminal
justice system invites intervention from other agents of state control,
for necessary goods such as money and security."); Richard Curtis, The Improbable
Transformation of Inner-City Neighborhoods: Crime, Violence, Drugs, and Youth in the
1990s, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1233, 1271-74 (describing those who got involved in
drug dealing in order to support family members).
88 See, e.g., Seth C. Kalichman et al., Sexual Coercion, Domestic Violence, and
Negotiating Condom Use Among Low-Income African American Women, 7 J. WOMEN'S
HEALTH 371, 373 (1998). Low income African American women who experienced sexual
coercion and physical violence from partner(s) were also more likely to have used illicit
drugs in their last sexual encounter and were more likely to report that they were afraid to
ask their male partner(s) to use condoms because they feared their abuse. Id.
89 See BETH RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF BATTrERED
BLACK WOMEN 123-27 (1996) (finding in interviews with battered women in prison that
some developed drug dependencies while using drugs in order to establish stronger
connections with their drug using, battering partners).
90 See Cynthia Chandler et al., Community-Based Alternative Sentencing for HIV-
Positive Women in the Criminal Justice System, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 66, 78 (1999)
(noting that some battered women become addicted through attempts to self-medicate);
RICHIE, supra note 89, at 125 (describing a woman whose abusive boyfriend brought her
morphine to dull the pain from abuse).
91 See RICHIE, supra note 89, at 126 (describing an interview with a white woman
arrested on drug charges who sold drugs in order to finance an escape from a very violent,
abusive partner).
92 See discussion supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
93 See Coker, Crime Control, supra note 16, at 837-39. Poor women, and particularly
poor African American women, suffer significant rates of domestic violence at the hands of
intimate partners. See also JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE
POWER OF JUDICIAL RESPONSES 22-24 (1999) (reviewing data from various studies and
finding that domestic violence is more prevalent and more severe in low-income families);
Coker, Shifting Power, supra note 15, at 1020; Richie, supra note 72, at 142 (finding that as
a result of distrust in the justice system, women may not seek assistance from the system).
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notably child protection services 94 and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. Children whose mothers are incarcerated often end up in state
care, 95 but even when mothers are not charged with criminal offending,
exposing their partners' criminal offending may prompt child protection
intervention.96
Finally, an additional consequence of aggressive over-policing and the
concentration of incarceration in poor minority neighborhoods is the way in
which police suspicion and law enforcement practice diminish the liberty
and dignity accorded all members of the targeted group.97
In summary, current drug enforcement efforts that are concentrated on
drug sellers in inner city racial minority neighborhoods deepen the poverty
and social disorganization of these neighborhoods, thus deepening the
vulnerability of residents to violence and crime. These enforcement efforts
create a cycle of ever increasing incarceration. The enforcement likely
increases criminal offending, heavy surveillance increases apprehension of
criminal offending, and the concentration of individuals on parole or
94 See Lisa Maher & Richard Curtis, Women on the Edge of Crime: Crack Cocaine and
the Changing Contexts of Street-Level Sex Work in New York City, in CRIMINOLOGY AT THE
CROSSROADS: FEMINIST READINGS IN CRIME AND JUSTICE 100, 110 (Kathleen Daly & Lisa
Maher eds., 1998) ("The expanded interface between the criminal law and women's lives
afforded by the 'war on drugs' has been accompanied by increased administrative regulation
which, in labeling these women 'unfit mothers,' has sought to remove their children, their
welfare and Medicaid benefits and their housing-usually in that order."). Poor women, and
particularly poor African American women, are much more likely to have their children
placed in foster care. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS (2002).
95 Mauer & Chesney-Lind, supra note 71, at 3. Some states make incarceration grounds
for the termination of parental rights. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 39.464 (2002); Jean M.
Johnson & Christa N. Flowers, You Can Never Go Home Again: The Florida Legislature
Adds Incarceration to the List of Statutory Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights, 25
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 335 (1998).
96 African American children are disproportionately represented in the foster care roles.
See ROBERTS, supra note 94.
97 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV.
946, 962 (2002) (describing personal experiences of police suspicion and maltreatment based
on race, concluding "[o]ur privacy had been invaded, we experienced a loss of dignity, and
our blackness had been established--once more-as a crime of identity."); Jerome McCristal
Culp, Jr., Notes from California: Rodney King and the Race Question, 70 DENV. U. L. REV.
199, 206 (1993) ("Every time there is a conflict between the rights of the majority and my
rights as a stereotypical black male, my rights cannot always be subordinate, or else I have
no rights at all."); Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129 (1987)
(describing her rage and hurt when she was denied access to a store because of her race);
RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 44-46 (describing the costs to the community of race-related
police abuse); Taslitz, supra note 6; Alschuler, supra note 6, at 212 ("Targeting only black
street gangs or only black drug dealers ... clearly conveys the message that blacks are more
to be feared than whites.").
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probation increases the range of offenses for which persons can be charged.
In addition, the suspicion with which residents are treated likely results in
some number of innocents charged and convicted.98
II. THE COURT'S RESPONSE
For the most part, criminal defendants have been unsuccessful in
challenging racially disproportionate surveillance, incarceration, or
application of the death penalty.99 It is old news that the Court's intent-
based requirements for discrimination are seldom adequate to address the
kinds of systemic discrimination that are most common. 00 The Court's
discovery rule in Armstrong and Bass creates obstacles for defendants that
exceed those created by the need to prove discriminatory intent.
In United States v. Armstrong,'0' and the recent per curiam decision in
United States v. Bass, 0 2 defendants moved for discovery in support of their
98 For example, in the case of Timothy Brown, a mildly retarded African American
individual convicted of murder and later exonerated, police focused on Brown because he
was known to be a drug user who engaged in petty juvenile offenses. Interview with Brenda
Bryn and Timothy Day, Federal Public Defenders in Coral Gables, Fla. (Sept. 24, 2003).
99 See, e.g., McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987) (where evidence that
defendants in his jurisdiction charged with killing whites were 4.3 times more likely to
receive the death penalty than those charged with killing blacks and that black defendants
who killed white victims had the highest chance of receiving the death penalty failed to
prove discrimination in defendant's case); Whren v. United States, 488 U.S. 857 (1988)
(legitimating pretextual traffic stops). For a small portion of the relevant scholarship, see
COLE, supra note 8, at 161 ("The Court has imposed nearly insurmountable barriers to
persons challenging race discrimination at all stages of the criminal justice system, from
policing to judging to sentencing. With the exception of jury discrimination, the barriers are
so high that few claims are even filed .... "); Carbado, supra note 97, at 1043 (arguing that
the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates a "perpetrator's perspective" that
focuses on the actions of police officers when it would be preferable for the Court to adopt a
"victim's perspective" that addresses the seizure question "from the perspective of a person
in the defendant's position" and including the affects of race and racism in that assessment).
See generally Alschuler, supra note 6 (describing the failure of the Court to fairly address
claims of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system).
100 A number of scholars have argued that intent-based discrimination standards are
wholly inadequate to address the kind of systemic discrimination that marks much of current
American society. See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices and
the Limits of Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 363, 367 (1996) ("[A] central tenet of prevailing
equality jurisprudence [that] human freedom requires that protection of private interests from
government intrusion must supersede government promotion of equality ... serves to
maintain white supremacy. ... ); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race,
and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005-13 (1986) (arguing that an equality
framework focused on anti-subordination is superior to the Court's current focus); Mar J.
Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Anti-Discrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the
Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1392-1401 (1991).
101 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
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selective prosecution claims. In Armstrong, defendants argued that federal
prosecutors selectively chose to indict African Americans in federal court
for crack cocaine offenses, while whites were prosecuted in state court
where conviction carried much shorter sentences. 10 3 In support of their
discovery motion, defendants offered evidence that all of the twenty-four
cases closed by the Federal Public Defender's office involving defendants
charged with crack cocaine offenses involved African American
defendants, 10 4 that an intake counselor at a drug treatment center told
defense counsel that the number of whites who use and deal drugs is
equivalent to the number of racial minority persons who do so, 0 5 and that
in the experience of a seasoned criminal defense attorney, many nonblacks
were prosecuted in state court for crack offenses.
10 6
The Supreme Court ruled that to gain discovery, defendants must
proffer evidence that "similarly situated" whites were treated more
favorably. 0 7 The Court then dismissed the "similarly situated" evidence
proffered by the defendants. The Court explained that the testimony
regarding the experiences of the drug counselor and the defense attorney
were "hearsay and . . . personal conclusions based on anecdotal
evidence"' 8 and the study of cases handled by the federal public defender
"failed to identify individuals who were not black and could have been
prosecuted for [the same offense]." 10 9
In Bass, the Court reiterated its discovery standard set forth in
Armstrong and made clear that the same standard applied even when the
claim was selective prosecution in electing to pursue the death penalty."0
Bass sought to prove that the federal prosecutor's decision to pursue the
death penalty in his case was based on his race. His primary evidence of
racial effect was the Department of Justice survey ("2000 Survey")
described earlier."' Recall that the survey found that for the years 1998-
2000, fifty-one percent of the defendants against whom the Department of
102 536 U.S. 862 (2002).
103 517 U.S. at459.
104 id.
'0' Id. at 460.
106 id.
107 Id. at 470. Defendants must proffer evidence to support the elements of the offense:
that the prosecutorial policy in question "had a discriminatory effect and.., was motivated
by a discriminatory purpose." Id. at 465. In order to show "discriminatory effect,"
defendants must show that similarly situated whites were treated more favorably. Id.
'08 Id. at 470.
109 Id.
"10 United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002).
111 Survey 2000, supra note 61.
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Justice sought the death penalty were African American, compared to only
twenty-five percent who were white."' A similar disparity existed in those
cases in which the Attorney General authorized death penalty prosecution
but the defendant later agreed to a plea bargain. "3
The Court held that Bass's evidence was inadequate to support a claim
for discovery.' 14 With regard to the evidence that African Americans are
charged in federal court more often with a death-eligible offense than are
whites, the Court determined that Bass failed to demonstrate that there were
"similarly situated" whites who were not so charged.) 5  The Court
dismissed as irrelevant the racial disparities in plea bargaining because Bass
was offered a plea bargain which he refused.'
6
A. THE REALITY: CATCH-22
"[O]ne cannot even get discovery without evidence, and one can rarely get
evidence which will satisfy a court without discovery. "l 17
There are three problems with the Court's "similarly situated"
discovery standard. First, in many cases, comparative data regarding whites
may simply not exist. Thus, where the claim is that "similarly situated"
whites are not arrested or charged at all, the defendant's task is impossible,
absent the fortuity of social science data that examines the jurisdiction in
question. 18 The second problem with the "similarly situated" standard is
that often, when the data does exist, it is in the exclusive control of the
government. For example, imagine the situation of a capital defendant such
as Bass in seeking to prove that the decision to mount a death penalty
prosecution is the result of racial bias. Given the various aggravating and
mitigating factors that a prosecutor might reasonably consider in
determining whether to charge the death penalty, without the benefit of
discovery, the defendant will not have the case information to present a
meaningful assessment of whites similarly situated. Without such evidence
of "similarly situated" whites, the defendant is unlikely to be granted
112 Id. at 23-24.
113 id.
"14 Bass, 536 U.S. at 864.
'' Id. at 863-64.
116 Id. See infra note 149 and accompanying text for discussion of the reason that Bass
rejected the plea bargain.
" Chin, supra note 83, at 267.
118 For an excellent discussion of the difficulties with making a selective prosecution
claim, given the Court's discovery ruling in Armstrong, see Richard H. McAdams, Race and
Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605
(1998).
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discovery.' 19 The third problem with the Court's discovery standard is that
finding "similarly situated" whites is something of a moving target. In
cases such as Armstrong, where public documents may be available to show
that "similarly situated" whites are treated more favorably, the Court's
standard for discovery appears difficult, but not impossible. 2 ° But, of
course, whether it is merely difficult or actually impossible depends a great
deal on how courts understand what it means for whites to be "similarly
situated."
There are two ways in which the "similarly situated" standard becomes
a moving target. First, courts hostile to selective prosecution claims may
find that any white comparator is not "similarly situated." For example, in
United States v. Smith,' 2' defendants charged with voter fraud offenses
alleged that the prosecutor was motivated to charge them because of their
membership in a black political organization.122  The defendants were
charged with casting fraudulent absentee ballots. 23  Defendants claimed
that others who engaged in the same behavior, but who were affiliated with
a predominantly white political organization, were not charged.
2 4
119 Indeed, there are those who argue that it is impossible to compare any two death
penalty cases. Andrew McBride, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
Virginia testified in a Senate Subcommittee hearing:
The Subcommittee should be very wary of the results of regression analysis or other statistical
devices applied to capital punishment. No two capital defendants are the same. No two capital
crimes are the same.... There are literally millions of legitimate variables that a prosecutor or
jury could consider in seeking or imposing capital punishment.
Racial and Geographic Disparities in the Federal Death Penalty System: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2 (2001) [hereinafter Senate Subcommittee Hearings] (statement of
Andrew G. McBride, former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia), available
at http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/oldsite/hr061301 scfp.htm.
120 This was the sentiment of the majority in Armstrong:
[l]t should not have been an insuperable task to prove that persons of other races were being
treated differently than respondents. For instance, respondents could have investigated whether
similarly situated persons of other races were prosecuted by the State of California and were
known to federal law enforcement officers, but were not prosecuted in federal court.
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996).
121 231 F.3d 800 (1 th Cir. 2000).
122 id.
123 The court noted that to be "similarly situated," whites not charged must have engaged
in precisely the same conduct. They must have "appl[ied] for and cast[] fraudulent absentee
ballots, and.., forged the voter's signature or knowingly gave false information on a ballot
affidavit or application, and ... the voter whose signature those individuals signed denied
voting," but also must be "similarly situated" in terms of the prosecution's case against them,
"and against whom the government had evidence that was as strong as the evidence it had
against Smith and Tyree." Id. at 811.
124 Id. at 810-11.
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Defendants presented evidence that individuals affiliated with the white
political organization harassed voters, tried to influence someone's vote,
paid people to vote, changed a vote on a ballot, and stole a ballot from a
mailbox. 25 The court found that this conduct was not similar to that
alleged against defendants because it did not include casting fraudulent
absentee ballots. 126 Therefore, the comparators were not similarly situated
to the defendants. Defendants also presented evidence that persons
affiliated with the white political group engaged in the same conduct for
which defendants were indicted-falsifying absentee ballots. The court
found that these persons were not "similarly situated" because the
comparators engaged in the conduct only once or twice each while one
defendant was alleged to have done so seven times and a second defendant
to have done so three times.12  The court did not explain why the
comparator's three times was significantly dissimilar to defendant's two
times.
The second way in which the "similarly situated" standard creates a
moving target is that the standard recapitulates the social science debate
about race and offending. 28  As David Cole notes in discussing race
differences in sentencing, researchers do not agree on what factors should
be considered "similar" for the purpose of comparing the sentences of
whites and non-whites. 29 Further, even if there were agreement on what
counts as similar, "no study could possibly measure all such factors.' ' 30
1II. THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPLANATION FOR RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM: VIOLENT DRUG-TRAFFICKING GANGS
A. THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE RESULTS OF THE
DEATH PENALTY SURVEYS
The political discourse regarding the findings of the DOJ death penalty
survey released in 2000 provides further evidence of the difficulty of
pinning a reasonable meaning to the term "similarly situated." The 2000
Survey prompted an immediate response from then Attorney General Janet
Reno who "directed that further study be carried out to illuminate any
125 Id. at 811.
126 Id. at 810.
127 Id. at 812.
128 See infra notes 172-80 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of
determining drug offending rates); see also infra notes 217-29 (describing research regarding
differential racial offending).
129 COLE, supra note 8, at 150 (discussing the work of Barbara Meierhoefer).
130 id.
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statistical disparities at other stages of the process, such as decisions
whether to pursue federal rather than state charges in potentially capital
cases."' 3 ' Reno ordered the National Institute of Justice ("NIJ") to solicit
outside research proposals to conduct a study of the federal system. 132 She
also required U.S. Attorneys to submit summaries of all cases in which a
capital eligible crime could have been charged, but was not.
133
The supplemental data from the U.S. Attorneys was compiled and
analyzed in a second DOJ report ("Survey 2001") released June 6, 2001,134
under new Attorney General John Ashcroft. Sharp racial disparities were
also apparent in this sample. Survey 2001 included an additional 291 cases,
for a total of 973 cases. 135 Of the 973 defendants who were either charged
with a death-eligible offense or whose conduct was such that they could
have been charged with a death-eligible offense, only seventeen percent
were white, while forty-two percent were black and thirty-six percent were
Hispanic.
136
Unlike the first survey completed under Attorney General Reno's
tenure, which reported data in a fairly straight forward manner with little
commentary, the 2001 Survey completed after Ashcroft was appointed, was
clearly an advocacy piece. 137 The author of the survey argued that the racial
131 Survey 2001, supra note 68.
132 See National Institute of Justice, Strategic Planning Meeting on Research Involving
the Federal Death Penalty System (January 10, 2001), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/ nij/s1000490-a.pdf [hereinafter NY Planning Meeting] (a
summary of a meeting convened by NIJ to discuss potential research to address the racial
disparities found in the DOJ study). See also, Nat'l Inst. of Just., Solicitation, Research Into
the Investigation and Prosecution of Homicide: Examining the Federal Death Penalty
System, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/sI000490.pdf [hereinafter, NIJ
Solicitation]. See infra pages 858-60 (discussing the NIJ studies that were subsequently
funded).
133 Survey 2001, supra note 68. This included those cases where the offender's alleged
conduct could have resulted in an indictment with an offense eligible for capital prosecution,
but the defendant was not so charged, including where the decision not to so charge was the




137 For example, the author noted in three places that particular data does not warrant an
implication of racial discrimination. Id. "Given the absence of any reason to expect a priori
that racial or ethnic bias would play a role in federal capital punishment decisions, the
question then becomes whether there is empirical evidence which nevertheless demonstrates
that the system is subverted by such bias." Id. "The Department's follow-up study . . .
produced no evidence that [the] statistical disparity results from bias or prejudice." Id.
"Inferring bias from disparities [in plea bargaining] ... would not be justified unless non-
invidious causes could be excluded . I..." ld. Survey 2000, by contrast, presented only the
statistics.
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disparities in the pool of death-eligible cases and the resulting disparity in
death penalty prosecutions were the result of individual district priorities,
rather than overall trends in federal prosecution. 138 The author pointed to
two areas of district concern that accounted for much of the racial disparity:
enforcement efforts against "violent gangs" that traffic in illicit drugs 139 and
inmate violence in federal prisons. 140  The 2001 Survey authors provided
examples from four districts,14' with the greatest part of the analysis
focused on the Eastern District of Virginia. This district sent for review
42
sixty-six capital cases, fifty-nine of which were for African Americans, five
for whites, and two for Hispanics. 143  Thus, eighty-nine percent of the
defendants were African Americans, while only 7.6% were whites and
about three percent were Hispanic. 144 Fifty-one percent of the cases arose
from federal drug enforcement task force efforts.145  The 2001 Survey
author explained, "[t]he defendants in these [drug-related cases] are not
White because the members of the drug gangs that engage in large-scale
trafficking in the Eastern District of Virginia are not White."'
146
138 Id. Facial disproportions are explained by individual district concerns: in the Eastern
District of Virginia, enforcement focus on drug gangs and prison killings; the same in the
District of Columbia; and killings by prison gang members in Central District of California.
Id.
139 Id. Fifty-one percent of cases referred by the Eastern District of Virginia came from
drug cases; all such cases involved African American or Hispanic defendants. Id Sixty-six
percent of the cases referred by the District of Columbia involved killings related to drug
offending and all but one of the defendants was African American. Id.
140 Id. Twenty-nine percent of the sixty-six cases referred by the Eastern District of
Virginia involved killings committed by inmates at federal prison. Id. Prosecution of
"Mexican Mafia" gang members for killings in California prisons accounts for some of the
disproportionate number of Hispanics in Central District of California case referrals. Id.
141 Id. (Eastern District of Virginia); Id. (District of Puerto Rico, where, not surprisingly,
all cases involved Hispanic defendants); Id. (District of Columbia, where twenty-two of
twenty-three cases involved African American defendants); Id. (Central District of
California, where three whites, four African Americans, and six Hispanics were represented
for a total of fifteen defendants).
142 The policy in place required that U.S. Attorneys submit to the Office of the Attorney
General for review all cases in which a defendant was charged with a capital eligible offense.
The U.S. Attorneys were to provide recommendations for or against death penalty
prosecution. Survey 2000, supra note 61, at 2. A review committee consisting of senior
Department of Justice attorneys then made a recommendation whether or not to pursue the
death penalty while the Attorney General made the final decision. Id.
143 Survey 2001, supra note 68.
144 id.
145 Id. The second largest category was killings committed by inmates in federal prison
(twenty-nine percent). Id. Additional cases involved kidnapping, carjacking, bank robbery,
and one charge for murder in a federal enclave. Id.
146 Id. The Survey continues, "[t]here is nothing illegitimate about a district focusing on
the actual needs of the geographic area for which it is responsible in decisions about the
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In response to racial disparities in plea bargaining, the 2001 Survey
author suggested that African Americans and Hispanics may be more
inclined to reject a plea offer than are whites:
In contrast to a recommendation for or against seeking the death penalty, the decision
about pleas is not under the control of the U.S. Attorney's office. It takes two to make
a plea agreement. Inferring bias from disparities in such agreements would not be
justified unless non-invidious causes could be excluded, including possible
differences in the inclination of defendants from different groups to seek or accept
plea bargains.147
The 2001 Survey author proffered no evidence--empirical or
anecdotal-to support the claim that nearly all major drug traffickers in the
Eastern District of Virginia were African American 148 or that African
Americans and Latinos were less likely to accept an equally attractive plea
offer than were whites. 149 Whether an equal number of plea offers were
made to African Americans and Latinos as were made to white defendants
and whether those offers were similar in both procedure and substance are
questions that could be answered by Justice Department data, yet the survey
contained no such data. 5°
exercise of federal jurisdiction," and concludes "in districts which accord a high priority to
federal prosecution of violent drug gangs, that focus tends to generate a high volume of
federal prosecutions involving drug-related killings." Id.
147 Id. The facts of Bass, however, suggest that the reasons for rejecting a plea
agreement may involve prosecutorial misconduct, rather than "group" preferences. See infra
note 149 (describing prosecutorial misconduct that led court to suspend plea negotiations and
Bass to file a motion to dismiss).
148 See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text. As Professor Samuel Gross notes:
"[h]ow does the Department of Justice know that all major drug traffickers in [the Eastern
District of Virginia]-from Arlington to Norfolk to Richmond-are minorities? The report
does not say. Are we supposed to accept this extraordinary statement on faith?" Senate
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 119 (testimony of Samuel R. Gross, Visiting Professor,
Columbia University Law School).
149 Survey 2001, supra note 68. If the facts surrounding the plea offered Bass are any
indication, there may be good reason for defendants to reject plea offers. While considering
a plea offer in exchange for his cooperation, Bass learned that confidential information he
had provided the prosecutor had been given to another prisoner in the same detention facility
in the form of an FBI interview form. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 1-2 n.I, United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002) (No. 01-1471). The
prisoner had been arrested based on the information provided by Bass. Id. According to
Bass's lawyers, the breach in confidentiality prompted the trial court to refuse to proceed
with the plea bargaining, and to request a formal investigation. Id. Bass filed a motion to
dismiss the charges and that motion was pending at the time briefs were filed with the U.S.
Supreme Court. Id. at 1-2.
150 See Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 119 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. On the Judiciary). Senator Leahy notes:
[The 2001 Survey] impl[ies] that .. .minority defendants are disproportionately disinclined to
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B. VIOLENT GANGS ENGAGED IN LARGE SCALE DRUG TRAFFICKING
The argument made by the Department of Justice in the 2001 Survey is
similar to the one made in Armstrong: federal agents did not intend to
discriminate against African Americans; rather, the agents were focused on
fighting violent drug gangs whose members happened to be African
American.15' The claim is primarily about intent-that is, prosecutors were
not motivated by racial animus. But the claim is also empirical: "[t]he
defendants in these cases are not White because the members of the drug
gangs that engage in large-scale trafficking in the Eastern District of
Virginia are not White."'
' 52
The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in a case decided soon after
Armstrong provides an example of the difficulties with the government's
claims regarding the racial or ethnic makeup of drug gangs. Defendants in
United States v. Turner 53 made the same argument as Armstrong-that
federal prosecutors chose to prosecute African American defendants for
crack cocaine violations in federal court, while whites were prosecuted in
state court where they faced significantly shorter sentences. 154 The
defendants in Turner had a significant advantage over the Armstrong
defendants, however, because they had hard evidence of "similarly
situated" whites who were treated more favorably' 55  Criminologists
Richard Berk and Alec Campbell's study of arrest and charging decisions in
Los Angeles for crack cocaine offenses demonstrated that in state charging
data the ratio of African Americans to whites was roughly the same as it
seek or accept plea agreements. What the report does not say is whether minority defendants are
given the same opportunities to plead to non-capital charges. The Department could have
investigated this question by asking its prosecutors which defendants were offered plea bargains
and which were not. Apparently, this was not done.
Id.
151 Of course, by definition, those defendants whose cases were in the survey pool were
accused of having committed a violent act, but Attorney General Ashcroft's argument is that
drug enforcement against violent gangs produces death eligible cases against more African
Americans than it does against whites (at least in the Eastern District of Virginia). If there
are violent white gangs that are not targeted by federal law enforcement, than the empirical
basis for the statement fails.
152 Survey 2001, supra note 68. The Survey continues, "There is nothing illegitimate
about a district focusing on the actual needs of the geographic area for which it is responsible
in decisions about the exercise of federal jurisdiction," and concludes "in districts which
accord a high priority to federal prosecution of violent drug gangs, that focus tends to
generate a high volume of federal prosecutions involving drug-related killings." Id.
' 104 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1997).
114 Id. at 1181-82.
151 Id. at 1182.
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was in state arrest data. 56 However, this was not the case with federal data
where forty-nine percent of the African Americans arrested for selling crack
cocaine were subsequently charged, while no Anglos were so charged .
57
The researchers concluded that "African Americans in general and African
Americans who are charged with offenses involving cocaine base [crack] in
particular are at greater risk of being charged with federal crimes than other
racial/ethnic offenders."' 58
The government contended that a legitimate focus on violent drug
gangs explained the racial disparity in federal prosecutions. 159 The Ninth
Circuit found that Berk and Campbell's study did not satisfy the
requirement of proving racial effect because "there [was] no showing at all
that the crack cocaine sellers prosecuted by California were gang members
who sold large quantities of crack; so the principal characteristic of the
federal defendants [was] omitted."'' 60 The Ninth Circuit based its reasoning,
in part, on the testimony of an FBI Special Agent that "within Los Angeles
county much of the violent crime committed by street gangs . . . was
connected to illegal drug trafficking.' 6' The Agent also testified to "his
own belief that 'no single event has contributed more to the explosive
growth of violent street gangs within the United States ... than the wide
availability of ... crack ... within American cities since the mid-to late
1980s. ,,,162
156 Richard Berk & Alec Campbell, Preliminary Data on Race & Crack Charging
Practices in Los Angeles, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 36 (July/Aug. 1993). The state data
showed a ratio of African Americans to Anglos arrested for crack cocaine offenses to be 3.4
to 1, id. at 37, and in charging data it was a comparable 3.8 to 1. Id. at 38.
117 Id. at 36.
158 Id. at 38.
159 See Turner, 104 F.3d at 1182-83.
160 Id. at 1185.
161 Id. at 1182. The opinion does not indicate that the witness testified to the amount of
violence committed by gang members as compared to violence committed by non-gang
members, only that when gang members commit violence it is mostly drug related.
162 Id. In contrast, the Federal Sentencing Commission reported that violence associated
with crack cocaine distribution has diminished. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (2002) 53, n. 123
(citing Dr. Alfred Blumstein's testimony that the maturation of crack markets resulted in a
national decrease in the violence associated with crack dealing). The Commission reports
that the number of crack cocaine offenses in which any participant had access to a weapon
went from 44.6% in 1995 to 35% in 2000. Id. The number of crack cases in 2000 in which
the offender had access to a weapon were less than 26%. Id. at 54. The number of powder
or crack cocaine cases in 2000 involving threatened or actual bodily injury was less than
10%. Id. at 57. However, some research indicates that gang related violence in Los Angeles
continued at a high level. Cheryl L. Maxson et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Youth Gang
Homicides in the United States in 1990, in RESPONDING TO GANGS: EVALUATION AND
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There are several problems with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Turner. First, whether a defendant is accused of being someone who sells
"large quantities" of a drug may be, in part, an artifact of enforcement
methods. As the Turner trial court noted, drug prosecutions are often the
result of "sting" operations in which under cover officers make repeat buys
until the target has sold a sufficient amount of drugs to warrant a lengthy
sentence, if convicted. 163 Therefore, even if whites charged in state court
were indicted for selling smaller amounts, it would be difficult to know
whether that reflected differences in offending or differences in
enforcement decisions. Second, just as conspiracy law widens culpability
to include a broad range of individuals whose involvement was minor, law
enforcement often views membership in gangs quite broadly. 164  It is
difficult to know to what extent gang affiliation results from police
attribution and how much from actual individual behavior. 65 Further, law
enforcement frequently uses race as a defining characteristic of gang
membership. 166 The trial court in Turner understood this:
RESEARCH, National Institute of Justice, 107, 125 (2002) (while gang related homicides went
down nationally, they continued to be very high in Los Angeles and Chicago).
163 United States v. Turner, 901 F. Supp. 1491, 1492 (C.D. Cal. 1995). See Blumstein,
supra note 24, at 99 ("Drug offenses are profoundly discretionary in terms of who gets
arrested, where police patrol, and in the aggressiveness of police, prosecution, and
sentencing policy that is targeted at drug offenders.").
164 For example, a 1992 report prepared by the District Attorney's staff in Los Angeles
reported that forty-seven percent of black men between twenty-one and twenty-four were in
police gang databases. Sheryl Stolberg, 150,000 are in Gangs, Report by D.A. Claims, L.A.
TIMES, May 22, 1992, at Al. In response to criticism for this gross over-characterization, the
District Attorney noted, "That number may be artificially high ... [b]ut on the other hand it
may not be .... It may mean just what it says, that about one out of every two young black
males are involved in gangs." Id.
165 For example, some survey data relied upon by the DOJ to determine the number of
gangs asks law enforcement personnel to provide information on gangs in their jurisdiction,
defining "gang" to be "a group of youths in your jurisdiction that you or other responsible
persons in your agency or community are willing to identify or classify as a 'gang.'
Maxson et al., supra note 162, at 119 (discussing The National Youth Gang Center Surveys).
While an abundance of evidence exists that youth (mostly) organizations exist in inner city
neighborhoods and that many of these organizations engage in criminal behavior, among
other activities, there may yet be a sense in which law enforcement engages in "subject
creation" of the kind described by Bernard Harcourt in his review of James Q. Wilson &
George L. Kelling's "Broken Windows" thesis. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the
Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows
Theory, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 371-80 (1998).
166 See, e.g., Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: Reflections on Race and the
Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 759-61
(1992) (describing the use by law enforcement and private agencies of "gang profiles" that
render young men of color suspect and subject to punitive sanctions and eviction from
private amusement parks).
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If these defendants had been white persons engaged in the same criminal activities,
they would not have been suspected of any gang association, they would not have
been stung by the government to increase the penalty for the offense, and they would
not have been selected by the U.S. Attorney for prosecution. They would not be here
today. Their real offense is alleged gang association, not the crack offenses with
which they are charged.
16 7
When race is a characteristic used to profile a "gang" member, it is
hardly surprising that law enforcement focused on gang members results in
the prosecution of disproportionately high numbers of those whose race is
used to define the category. Chicago's experience with its anti-gang
ordinance is instructive. The ordinance, which was subsequently deemed
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, 68 provided that police could order
persons to disperse if the individuals were in a public place with "no
apparent purpose" and if the police reasonably believed that one of the
parties was a gang member. 169 In the three years the ordinance was in
effect, police issued over 89,000 orders to disperse and arrested more than
42,000 persons for failure to obey those orders. 170 In 89,000 cases, police
officers "reasonably believed" that they were interacting with a gang
member. As Dorothy Roberts noted, "[p]olice not only believe that most
gang members belong to minority groups; they also believe that many, if
not most, inner-city minority youth are gang members."
171
None of this is intended to suggest that gang related violence is not
real,172 or that some of that violence is not drug-related, or that gang
violence has not had devastating consequences in inner city neighborhoods.
Gang violence can be real and, simultaneously, the government's
enforcement tactics and a priori categories of offenders can affect the race
disparities in targets for enforcement. 173
167 Turner, 901 F. Supp. at 1501.
168 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999).
169 Id. at 46.
170 Id. at 47.
171 Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword. Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 786 (1999).
172 See Curtis, supra note 87, at 1250-51 (explaining that some drug markets in Chicago
"earned reputation for controlling violence" while "distributors [in another area] . ..
employed it regularly and systematically"). Some research suggests that a significant
amount of gang-related violence is not drug related, however. See Anthony A. Braga &
David M. Kennedy, Reducing Gang Violence in Boston, in RESPONDING TO GANGS:
EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, supra note 162, at 265, 272 (a study of gang-related homicides
in Boston found that most were "personal and vendetta-like" rather than "about drugs,
money, or other issues").
173 See generally Harcourt, supra note 165 (describing the affect of subject creation in
the manner in which order maintenance policing creates "the disorderly").
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C. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH REGARDING DRUG DISTRIBUTION
As noted earlier, the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse,
17 4
based on a random sample study of household drug use, found that similar
percentages of whites and African Americans use drugs.' 75 Of course, the
operative question for the claim made by the Justice Department in Turner
and in the 2001 Survey is whether those similarities exist in data regarding
drug sales. I spoke to leading drug researchers in the country about this
question.' 76 They all said the same thing: it is impossible to tell. 77 It is
difficult to know the extent to which racial differences in the arrest and
incarceration rates for different drugs reflect law enforcement patterns
rather than drug distribution patterns. 178
Despite the difficulty in assessment, there are several factors that bring
into question the government's view on offending differences. Data on
those incarcerated for drug crimes (both state and federal) demonstrate that
the overwhelming majority are not violent offenders.' 79 Most reported that
they neither received a sentencing enhancement for use of a firearm related
to a drug offense, nor had they "ever been armed with a gun while
committing a crime."'' 80  A recent analysis of prisoner survey data
conducted by Eric Sevigny and Jonathan Caulkins found that most federal
174 See NHSDA, supra note 28.
175 Id. (describing drug use data).
176 Christine Crossland, social science analyst with the National Institute of Justice,
recommended that I address my query to four "well-respected researchers in the area of
drugs and crime" who are Professor Jonathan Caulkins, Carnegie Mellon University,
Professor John Eck, University of Cincinnati, Martin Iguchi, RAND Corporation, and
Sheigla Murphy, Institute for Scientific Analysis. E-mail from Christine Crossland, Social
Science Analyst, National Institute of Justice, to Donna Coker, Professor of Law, University
of Miami School of Law (July 15, 2003, 11:25 EST) (on file with author).
177 See e-mail from John Eck, Professor, University of Cincinnati, to Donna Coker,
Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law (July 15, 2003, 20:33 EST) (on file
with author) ("we have no systematic data on who deals drugs untainted by police agency
record keeping" though experience as an evaluation director for a regional drug enforcement
group was that the focus was on the most violent groups and enforcement was "highly
sensitive to the use of informants"); e-mail from Jonathan Caulkins, Professor, Carnegie
Mellon University, to Donna Coker, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law
(July 15, 2003, 16:48 EST) (on file with author) ("I think there is no scientifically valid way
to assess racial or ethnic distribution of drug sellers. Hence, one cannot assess scientifically
disproportionately in imprisonment for drug-law violations."); e-mail from Sheigla Murphy,
Director, Center for Substance Abuse Studies, to Donna Coker, Professor of Law, University
of Miami School of Law (July 17, 2003, 14:16 EST) (on file with author) (all of the relevant
information she has located thus far is based on arrest record data).
178 E-mail from Caulkins, supra note 177.
179 Sevigny & Caulkins, supra note 25.
180 Id. at 31 (quoting from survey questionnaire).
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and state prisoners incarcerated for drug offenses did not have prior
convictions for violent crimes. 181 Further, most incarcerated drug offenders
were not part of an organized drug group: 85.7% of federal drug offenders
and 91.9% of state drug offenders were not part of an organized drug
group. 82 While this raises questions for the government's explanation, it
again does not disprove the claim. It could be that those involved in violent
gang activity are prosecuted for separate violent crimes and, therefore, do
not show up in the numbers of those incarcerated for drug crimes. Such an
explanation would be consistent with the Justice Department's explanation
of race disparities in the death penalty data, but would seem somewhat
contrary to the government's argument in Armstrong and Turner. In those
cases, the federal government argued that racial disparities in indictments
for drug offending were the product of racial differences in membership in
violent drug gangs.
What is tremendously troubling is that, unlike the elements of a
charge, the decision to define some sellers as gang members, some
organizations as gangs, and to ascribe the violent behavior of some gang
members to that of others is wholly within the discretion of the prosecutor,
not subject to proof requirements, and because of Supreme Court
jurisprudence, not subject to meaningful judicial review.
D. NIJ STUDY PROPOSAL
Recall that former Attorney General Reno instructed the NIJ, the
research arm of the DOJ, to conduct a study, using outside researchers, to
examine the racial disparities in the federal death penalty system. Despite
Ashcroft's assurances in his nomination hearing that he supported the NIJ
study, the language of the 2001 Survey expressed reservations about the
value of such a study. Describing a meeting organized by NIJ to discuss
such a study, the 2001 Survey author concludes, "[such a study] would
entail a highly complex, multi-year research initiative .... [that if] carried
5,183out.., could not be expected to yield definitive answers ....
... Id. at 21.
182 Id. at 18. Though most drug offenders were not involved in an organized distribution
gang, they were nonetheless engaged in some drug distribution. Id. at 17-18 ("less than
[nine percent] of all drug inmates and only about one-half of [one percent] of federal drug
inmates were convicted of simple drug possession and described themselves as
user/possessor of quantities suitable for personal consumption"). And while most offenders
were not members of a gang, there were differences between federal and state inmate data:
more high-level importers, manufacturer/growers, money launderers, wholesale dealers, and
body guard/debt collectors were found in federal prison than were found in state prison
(38.9% versus 23.9%). Id. at 17.
183 Survey 2001, supra note 68, at 9. This summary of the meeting discussion was
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Subsequent to Senate Subcommittee hearings in which (then) majority
Democratic Senators chastised General Ashcroft for his failure to pursue the
study, 184 NIJ made a solicitation for research proposals.1 85 The proposals
were to address the following questions:
What are the characteristics of homicide cases and offenders indicted in State systems
as compared to those indicted in the Federal system?
What is the role of Federal law enforcement and its interaction with local and State
law enforcement in these cases?
What are the significant decision-making factors that determine whether a case is
prosecuted in the Federal or State system and whether a capital offense is charged?
What are the significant geographic, case, or other factors that help explain the
resulting distribution of homicide cases prosecuted in the Federal and State systems
and indicted on capital or noncapital charges?'
8 6
Eventually, two research proposals were funded. 87 The focus of these
research projects is far narrower than the one originally proposed in the
solicitation. 188 One project is a statistical study that will examine DOJ file
summaries of all the death-eligible cases reported to the Attorney General's
office by State Attorneys. 89  The researchers will examine different
variables to determine whether there is a significant correlation with the
decision of the State Attorney, the Attorney General's Review Committee,
or the Attorney General to seek the death penalty. 190
challenged by David Bruck of the Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel, who was also
present at the meeting. See testimony of David Bruck, Senate Subcommittee Hearings,
supra note 119, at 4. Indeed, the NIJ posting of the meeting summary suggests that
participants identified a range of research questions, some of which would require multi-year
research, but not all. See NI] Planning Meeting, supra note 132, at 4 (stating that some
participants suggested the use of a comprehensive prospective study analyzing homicide
cases from beginning to end).
184 See Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 119.
185 NY solicitation, supra note 132.
86 Id. at 7.
187 Telephone interview with Christopher Innes, Chief Justice Systems Research Division
(n.d.) (notes on file with author).
188 One researcher notes that the original solicitation was very broad and would have
been very costly to pursue, thus responders proposed more narrow projects. Telephone
Interview with Candace Johnson, Researcher, Justice Systems, Inc. (August 30, 2003) (notes
on file with author).
189 Telephone Interview with Stephen Klein, Senior Research Scientist, RAND (July 21,
2003) (notes on file with author); e-mail from Richard Berk, Professor, UCLA Dep't of
Statistics, to Donna Coker, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law (July 22,
2003, 16:22 EST) (notes on file with author).
190 See Klein Interview, supra note 189. Stephen Klein and Richard Berk with are
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The second project is a qualitative analysis of data from ten federal
districts. 191  The researchers will interview federal and local law
enforcement personnel, U.S. Attorneys, and some defense counsel
regarding the decision making that led to the federal prosecution of a
homicide case. 192 Researchers have examined case files of death-eligible
federal cases and are thinking of creating scenarios for law enforcement
officers and prosecutors that match the most common scenarios in case
files. The questions will regard the decision to prosecute the case federally
rather than leave it to the state to prosecute. Preliminarily, researchers are
finding that many of the homicide cases that come into the federal system
are the results of ongoing federal investigations. 93 They are also finding
significant differences between federal districts in terms of decisions to
prosecute homicides. 194
In combination, the two research projects will examine both decisions
made after a case becomes a federal case as well as information related to
the decision to bring a federal indictment, rather than allow a state to bring
a charge. Thus, theoretically, the combination of the projects can
investigate the question about race-based decision making that is central to
the claims in cases such as Bass, Armstrong, and Turner: did federal
prosecutors selectively choose to prosecute African American defendants.
Despite this attention to both entry into the federal system and
prosecutorial decision-making after entry, the two projects have serious
limitations. First, both research projects are heavily dependent on
information from the DOJ. The statistical project will rarely have access to
case information that is not filtered first by the U.S. Attorney's office that
generated the report summaries. 95 Second, it appears that the quantitative
analysis will be limited to those cases where the defendant was charged
with a death-eligible crime, 196 thus eliminating the ability to compare those
cases with those that could have been charged with a death eligible offense,
but were not. Third, though the qualitative research will examine entry into
the federal system, because there is no state data for comparison,
researchers can do little more than record what federal prosecutors say they
do in selecting cases. This means that the research will be of little help in
working together to determine what variables should be used. Id.




195 Klein Interview, supra note 189. A few files will have letters from defense counsel
arguing against a decision to seek the death penalty. Id.
196 Berk e-mail, supra note 189.
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answering allegations, for example, that federal prosecutors chose to bring
cases against African Americans in federal court because federal jury pools
are predominantly white while jury pools in state courts have larger African
American populations. 197 Finally, by focusing exclusively on prosecutorial
decision making, the research fails to gain information on the importance of
differential policing and decision making prior to charging. 98
IV. CHALLENGING RACIAL INJUSTICE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The Supreme Court's intentional discrimination standard is wholly
inadequate to address most of the racial disparity in the criminal justice
system, but the Court's additional requirement for discovery turns a slender
possibility into a farce. The result is a particularly inadequate safeguard
against injustice given the extraordinary power of prosecutors in this age of
mandatory minimums, sentence enhancements, sentencing guidelines, and
increased involvement in targeting enforcement. 199 In combination with the
197 As David Bruck, attorney for the Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel, noted in
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee:
[O]ne issue that bears serious study ... [is] the fact that removing a murder case from state to
federal court can mean the virtual exclusion of nonwhite decision-makers from the process. In
many urban jurisdictions ... African-American defendants charged in state courts are likely to
be tried by majority-black juries. However, prosecutors can draw an all-white or almost all-
white jury by the simple expedient of indicting the case in federal court instead .... If conscious
racial considerations do enter federal death penalty decision-making at all, they are much more
likely to appear in such ways as these, rather than as the straw man of explicit racial "favoritism"
that the Department of Justice seeks to dispel in its June 6 [Survey 2001 ] release.
Testimony of David I. Bruck, Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 119, at 7 n.3. For
a description of the work of the Federal Death Penalty Resource Center, see
http://www.capdefnet.org/fdprc/fdprcgateway.htmp (last accessed n.d.).
198 Researchers involved in the qualitative analysis report that preliminarily it appears
that many federal homicide cases arise from large scale investigations, some involving
federal-state task forces. Johnson Interview, supra 188. If this turns out to be the case, it is
consistent with the explanation offered by Ashcroft's Justice Department: most of the federal
homicide cases arose from drug enforcement efforts involving state-federal task forces. This
fact only highlights the importance of examining the entire drug enforcement effort to
determine both how individuals are targeted as well as how they are prosecuted. See
Alschuler, supra note 6, at 205 ("[T]he focus of counsel and the Court [in Armstrong] on
prosecutors . . . was divorced from the realities of the criminal justice system. . . . The
practice that in fact produced the racial disparity in Armstrong--differential targeting by law
enforcement-was off the Supreme Court's screen.").
199 See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: THE WAR ON CRIME AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1960-2000 (forthcoming 2003)
(manuscript at 10)
The hardening of criminal sanctions that began in the 1980s ... has expanded the classic power
of the prosecutor . . . . The formal length of sentence is probably less important than the
limitation, in many states and the federal system, of a substantial role for 'administrative' release
mechanisms like parole boards .... The growth of extreme sentences with no possibility of
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Court's decisions in McClesky 2 °° and Whren,01 the result is to effectively
close the court house door to claims of racial discrimination in the criminal
justice system, 202 except in the narrow case of jury selection.2"3
Proposals for federal legislation that would address racial disparities in
the criminal justice system have thus far been unsuccessful. The Racial
Justice Act 204 would allow capital defendants to support a claim of racial
discrimination in the operation of the death penalty by showing a consistent
pattern of racially discriminatory death sentences in the sentencing
jurisdiction.20 5  The proposed legislation has passed the House of
Representatives twice, but both times was dropped in conference with the
Senate. 20 6 The Traffic Stops Statistics Act,20 7 which would require police
officers to record data regarding traffic stops including the race of the
parole also deepens the significance of the prosecutor's charging role. By charging a suspect
with any of the many forms of special enhancement crimes like using a gun during the primary
offense, or having a previous serious or violent conviction, the prosecutor today can effectively
eliminate a person from the community for a generation.
Id.; see generally Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2001) (describing the extraordinary powers of
prosecutors); see Deborah Lamm Weisel, The Evolution of Street Gangs: An Examination of
Form and Variation, in RESPONDING TO GANGS, supra note 162, at 42 (describing the way in
which prosecutors working with the FBI sometimes use an "Enterprise Theory of
Investigation" in which "the prosecution is structured from the inception of the
investigation").
200 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987).
201 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision in
Whren). David Cole concludes that the Supreme Court "has immunized a wide range of law
enforcement from any Fourth Amendment review." COLE, supra note 8, at 53.
202 COLE, supra note 8, at 139. Cole notes that if the role of the Court is to protect the
despised minority from majoritarian politics, one can hardly think of a more classic case than
African American criminal defendants. Id. He concludes that "[l]egislators have little
interest in protecting the rights of accused criminals. So if the judiciary doesn't protect
them, nobody will." Id.
203 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that Equal Protection forbids a
prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race and establishing
a method of proving such discrimination).
204 See Don Edwards & John Conyers, Jr., The Racial Justice Act-A Simple Matter of
Justice, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 699, 699 (1995) (describing legislative efforts to pass the Act
and the failure of Congress to enact the legislation). The Racial Justice Act would allow
defendants to support a claim of racial discrimination in the operation of the death penalty by
showing a consistent pattern of racially discriminatory death sentences in the sentencing
jurisdiction. Id. at 700. See also the Traffic Stops Statistics Act, H.R. 1443, 106th Cong.
(1999), and the Innocence Protection Act, H.R. 912, 107th Cong. (2001).
205 Edwards & Conyers, supra note 204, at 704.
206 Id. at 700-01.
207 Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 1999, H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (1999).
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driver,208 has yet to be enacted.20 9 The Innocence Protection Act (IPA),21°
while not specifically focused on racial disparities, would provide greater
access to DNA testing in federal post-conviction cases, and funding to
states for DNA testing and for competent counsel for indigent defendants in
capital cases.2 1'
The political discourse regarding racial disparities in the criminal
justice system has largely focused on intentional discrimination committed
by actors motivated by racial bias.2 12  A focus on bad actors and racial
motives obscures the bigger picture of a system that systematically and
disproportionately burdens communities of color with the excesses of law
enforcement without many of the benefits.
There are better ways to understand discrimination in the criminal
justice system than to search for the bad actor. One such way would be to
assess the overall impact of criminal justice policies on the well-being of
208 Id.
209 David Harris notes, that despite the defeat of the Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act,
many jurisdictions began collecting such statistics and a number of states passed legislation
that mandated such data collection. David Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in
Criminal Justice: The Significance of Data Collection, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 82
(2003).
210 Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Act of 2003, S. 1700, 108th Cong.,
First Sess., Title III (the Innocence Protection Act) (2003) [hereinafter the Innocence
Protection Act]. See also Patrick Leahy, Symposium: Serenity Now or Insanity Later?: The
Impact of Post-Conviction DNA Testing on the Criminal Justice System: 35 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 605, 606 (2001) (describing the purposes of an early version of the Innocence
Protection Act).
21  The Innocence Protection Act, supra note 210, at §§ 311-12, 321.
212 For example, Attorney General Ashcroft's defense of the racial disparities in the
federal death eligible cases focused entirely on defeating charges of bad actors who acted
with racial malice. Aschroft describes racial unfairness in terms of "favoritism towards
white defendants," Survey 2001, supra note 68, at 11, and discrimination to mean that
prosecutors had a "particular desire to secure the death penalty for minority defendants." Id.
at 17. As Professor David Baldus notes in his criticisms of Ashcroft's response, "No one
with an understanding of the system suggests that it is driven by such conscious and blatant
animus against minority defendants .... ." Statement of David C. Baldus, Memo to the
Honorable Russell D. Feingold (June 11, 2001), available at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?scid= I 8&did=252 (regarding DOJ report on the Federal Death Penalty System
(June 6, 2001)). Prompted by the 2000 and 2001 DOJ Survey findings, the Senate Judiciary
committee held hearings on June 13, 2001 to hear testimony regarding the "racial and
geographic disparities in the federal death penalty system." Racial and Geographic
Disparities in the Federal Death Penalty System: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On the
Judiciary, Subcomm. On the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights, 107th Cong.
(2001), available at http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/oldsite/hr061301 scfp.htm (last
accessed October 15, 2003).
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communities of color, particularly African American communities who are
so frequently targeted by law enforcement efforts.
213
A. CHANGING WHITE PERCEPTIONS
Mobilizing communities to protest the racial injustice of the system,
working to change popular consciousness and therefore state law, may offer
more promise in the current political climate than either federal legislation
or litigation.' 14  This kind of political mobilization requires, in part,
addressing white misperceptions about crime and the criminal justice
response to crime.21 These white perceptions involve, in large measure,
213 See Roberts, supra note 171, at 835 (arguing that law enforcement policies can be
evaluated "on whether they further racial subordination or help to eradicate it"). Department
of Justice supporters argued in Senate subcommittee hearings in response to racial disparities
in federal death penalty data, as have others, that focusing drug enforcement efforts in inner
city neighborhoods means providing greater protection for the residents of those
communities. See Senate Subcommittee Hearings, statement of McBride, supra note 119.
No one can disagree that this is critically important. African Americans are
disproportionately victims of violent crime. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION N THE UNITED STATES, 2001 Statistical Tables, National
Crime Victimization Surveys, tbl.5 (2003) available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pdf/cvusolol.pdf (for all personal crimes, the rate of African American victims per 1000
persons age twelve or over was thirty-two, compared to a rate of 25.3 for whites and 19.9 for
"other" groups). Yet, if the argument for concentrated enforcement is to rest on community
needs for protection, then the government should prove the case that the benefits of its
current drug enforcement efforts outweigh the harms visited on the same community. This it
has failed to do.
214 Some state leaders have initiated reforms that may reduce the worst effects of racial
injustice in the criminal justice system. For example, officials in some states have argued
publicly for alternatives to incarceration for drug offenders and other nonviolent offenders.
See, e.g., Andy Paras, Chief Urges Reform of Sentencing, GREENVILLE NEWS, Aug. 4, 2003,
at 14A, available at http://greenvilleonline.com/news/2003/08/04/2003080411422.htm
(director of state Department of Corrections urges state to reduce prison population by
finding alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent offenders). More than fifteen states now
require police to collect and report race statistics on traffic stops, and several police
departments have voluntarily agreed to gather and publish such data. See Harris, supra note
45, at 82. The state of Kentucky passed the Kentucky Racial Justice Act which allows the
admissibility of statistical evidence to prove that race was the basis of a death penalty
decision. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300 (Michie 1998). Drug courts which focus on
rehabilitation rather than punishment for low-level offenders are now well-established and
some areas have focused drug enforcement efforts on sellers rather than buyers, thus
diminishing the affects of concentrated incarceration on inner city neighborhoods. See
Susan Finlay & Robin E. Wosje, Judges as Change Agents, NEV. LAW., Dec. 2002, at 22
(there are more than 1200 drug courts nationwide); Meares, Norms, supra note 24, at 397
(describing "reverse stings" in Chicago neighborhoods that targeted buyers, mostly white
suburban, rather than buyers, who were mostly inner city minorities).
215 Andrew Taslitz argues that in efforts to address racial inequality in the criminal
justice system it is important to organize both communities of color as well as whites.
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entrenched stereotypes about people of color, but particularly African
American individuals. Three primary obstacles to changing white
perceptions of crime and criminality create significant hurdles to political
mobilization. The first is the deeply embedded belief among whites of
black criminality. The second is that most whites understand race
discrimination to mean intentional actions motivated by a "bad" actor. The
third obstacle is the invisibility (to whites) of white privilege that largely
protects whites from the excesses of police mistreatment and suspicion.
As Kathryn Russell notes, whites believe both that African Americans
are arrested, charged and convicted in numbers disproportionate to their
population and that African Americans are responsible for most of the
21 217crime. 16 The first is accurate, the second is inaccurate. Whites account
for sixty-seven percent of all arrests and, in some categories of offenses,
whites account for more than eighty percent of all those arrested. 2 8 The
belief that most crime is committed by African Americans creates a fear of
black crime-and particularly violent crime-that is wholly out of
proportion to offending data. Yet, as Russell describes, the result of "[t]he
public's perception that crime is violent, Black, and male ... [is] to create
the criminalblackman.219  As David Cole notes, "[t]here is a mutually
reinforcing relationship between criminal stigmatization of blacks and racial
subordination: the criminal stigmatization of blacks perpetuates and
justifies their subordination as a group, and the status of blacks as a
segregated, subordinated group makes it easier to insist on ever-more-
stringent stigmatizing measures in the criminal law.,
220
The correct belief that African Americans are arrested and incarcerated
in disproportionate numbers gives rise to the more questionable belief that
they commit crimes in disproportionate numbers. It is this belief that serves
to rationalize racial profiling in traffic stop enforcement and searches.
221
Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power to
Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 273 (2003). Taslitz argues that
"an express focus on conscious or subconscious racial discrimination in policing is a
powerful way to motivate racial minorities as troops in the battle for reforming police search
and seizure and excessive force practices." Id. at 273.
216 RUSSELL, supra note 27, at I11.
217 Id. Russell notes that two thirds of arrests for street crimes are of whites. Id.
218 Id. (citing 1995 statistics from Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (1991-1995),
Bureau of Justice Statistics).
219 RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 114.
220 COLE, supra note 8, at 177.
221 See Harris, supra note 45, at 78 (describing police officers who argued that racial
profiling in traffic stops was justified by the disproportionate numbers of minorities arrested
and incarcerated).
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The evidence for differential offending rates is mixed,222 but as noted
earlier, it is particularly weak in the case of drug arrests. 223 Because "[d]rug
offenses are profoundly discretionary in terms of who gets arrested, where
police patrol, and in the aggressiveness of police, prosecution, and the
sentencing policy that is targeted at drug offenders, 224 there is little reason
to believe that arrest and incarceration data reflects actual rates of
offending. It is impossible to disentangle differential offending rates from
differential enforcement strategies. If African American communities are
more heavily policed and African American drivers more frequently
stopped and searched, the result will be more African Americans
incarcerated, regardless of their comparative offending rates with whites. 225
In addition to evidence of discriminatory police practices, evidence
suggests that African Americans arrested for drug offenses are treated more
222 See RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 27-46. Blumstein reports that for serious non-drug
crimes, African Americans make up roughly the same proportion of those arrested as for
those imprisoned, suggesting no racial discrimination occurs post-arrest that results in
disproportionate imprisonment. Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality, supra note 24, at 748.
Blumstein also notes other research demonstrating that for serious interpersonal crimes, the
percentage of African Americans arrested corresponds with the percentage identified as
perpetrators by victim reports. Id. There remain questions of differential enforcement and
differential reporting. Further, Blumstein finds that in the non-drug serious offense cases,
there remains twenty percent racial difference in incarceration that is not explained by
differences in offending rates. Id. at 749. Russell concludes that "research shows evidence
of racial discrimination against Blacks in the criminal justice system and evidence that
Blacks disproportionately offend." RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 30.
223 See Blumstein, supra note 24, at 746-48, 750-51 (with regard to serious non-drug
crimes, the fraction of arrests that are African Americans is similar to the fraction
incarcerated for the same crime, further, the victim's report of the race of the perpetrator in
interpersonal crimes is roughly similar to the race of those arrested for these crimes). Some
offending differences may be the product of differences in victim reporting. For example,
some research demonstrates that low-income African American women were more likely to
call the police in response to a domestic violence incident than were white women with
similar incomes or white women with higher incomes. See Ira W. Hutchison & J. David
Hirschel, Abused Women: Help-Seeking Strategies and Police Utilization in VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 436, 452-53 (1998) (reporting that African American low income battered
women were more likely to rely on police response than were white low income battered
women).
224 Alfred Blumstein, Mass Incarceration: Perspectives on U.S. Imprisonment, 7 U.CiI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 99 (2000).
225 In addition, as Bernard Harcourt demonstrates, even if it is true that a larger
percentage of African Americans commit crimes than is true of other racial groups, where
crime is abundant and law enforcement is limited, if police efforts are apportioned in
accordance with offending rates, and the same percentages of arrests maintain, the effect
over time is to ratchet up the racial disproportionality. Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne 'er-
Do-Well to the Criminal History Category: The Refinement of the Actuarial Model in
Criminal Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 135 (2003).
DONNA COKER
harshly after arrest than are whites. Criminologist Alfred Blumstein reports
that while African Americans comprise about forty percent of those arrested
for drug offenses, they comprise nearly sixty percent of those serving prison
sentences for drug offenses. 226
Even with regard to those categories of crime where African
Americans appear to offend at higher rates, 227 twenty percent of the race
disparities in sentencing remain unexplained by racial differences in
offending.228  This residual difference of twenty percent represents ten
thousand African American prisoners. 229 As Kathryn Russell notes, "[t]en
thousand Blacks who may have been treated more harshly by the criminal
justice system because of their race, constitutes an enormous social
problem., 230 Thus, with regard to serious non-drug offenses, there remain a
significant number of African American prisoners whose imprisonment
may be the result of their race. With regard to drug offenses, there are
likely many more African Americans whose imprisonment is a result of
their race.
Despite this evidence that a significant portion of racial disparities
represents differences in enforcement and differences in treatment, the link
in white consciousness between African Americans and criminality remains
strong. Andrew Taslitz worries that some education efforts aimed at whites
may inadvertently reinforce this connection.231 Taslitz points to the
arguments made by the executive director of Amnesty International that
suggest that one way in which whites are harmed by racial profiling is that
it may create racial unrest such as the riots in Los Angeles that followed the
acquittal of the police officers who beat Rodney King.232 Taslitz worries
that this kind of appeal reinforces the idea of African American violence
and criminality.
233
226 Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality, supra note 24, at 751-52
227 Id. at 746 (finding that the proportion of arrestees for serious street crime that are
African American is similar to the proportion in prison for the same crime categories, thus
suggesting that there is no discrimination in the treatment post-arrest). Blumstein cites other
research that finds similarities between victim reports of offender race and arrests for the
relevant crimes thus suggesting that there is little discrimination in arrest for serious crimes.
Id. at 748 (citing Michael Hindelang's research).
228 Id. at 747 (citing his earlier study, Blumstein concludes that "eighty percent of the
[racial] disproportionality in prison was explained just by the differential involvement in
arrest").
229 Id. at 747.
230 RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 31. Further, Blumstein's comparison of arrest versus
incarceration rates does not address racial differences in sentencing.
23 1 Taslitz, supra note 215, at 276-77.
232 Id. at 276-77.
233 Id.
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Devon Carbado raises a related but different set of concerns. He
writes that "the public campaign against racial profiling invariably calls
upon notions of innocence. 234 Carbado notes that an ACLU pamphlet on
traffic stops and racial profiling features the pictures and personal stories of
two "respectable" looking African American victims of profiling.
235
However, the discussion of the Whren case, which permitted pretextual
stops, includes no picture of Whren and provides no personal story.
Carbado concludes that Whren was treated in this way because he is not a
"respectable" individual; he was a drug possessor. The paradigmatic
reform narrative here is one where a "bad" police officer conducts a race-
based stop of a "good" African American. 236  The result, according to
Carbado, is that this "good black/bad cop framework ... renders [cases like
Whren] difficult to challenge publicly. '237 Further, the focus on "good" or
"respectable" African Americans may reinforce the idea that these
individuals are the exceptions, while most African Americans suspected by
the police of criminal misconduct are, in fact, guilty.
The concerns of Carbado and Taslitz are supported by research that
demonstrates the difficulty of changing negative racial stereotypes.238
234 Carbado, supra note 97, at 1035.
235 Id. at 1038.
236 Id. at 1040-41. Carbado notes that Randall Kennedy's proposal that African
Americans adopt a "politics of respectability" is consistent with the manner in which the
ACLU pamphlet is written. Id. at 1038-39; see RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE
LAW 19-21 (1997). Kennedy argues that "those dedicated to advancing the interests of
African Americans ought to urge them to conduct themselves in a fashion that . . . elicits
respect and sympathy rather than fear and anger from colleagues of other races." KENNEDY,
supra note 237, at 21. Carbado writes that Kennedy fails to recognize the costs of his
proposal. One of the costs is to reinforce the notion that there are "good" and "bad" blacks.
Carbado, supra note 97, at 1042. Thus,
to the extent that police officers operate under the assumption that part of their law enforcement
project is to ferret out the 'good' blacks from the 'bad' blacks, and to the extent that the
goodness (noncriminality) of blackness is not assumed but must be demonstrated ... all black
people are vulnerable to racial profiling.
Id. at 1043. Regina Austin notes that this emphasis on "respectability"-what she calls a
"politics of distinction"-counters stereotypes of deviance, however, "[o]n the downside [it]
... intensifies divisions .... [and] furthers the interests of a middle class .... The persons
who fare best under this approach are those who are the most exceptional (i.e., those most
like successful white people)." Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers,
and the Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1773 (1992). Angela Harris
argues that giving voice to the community in responding to crime offers an alternative that is
neither a "politics of identification" with lawbreakers nor is it "politics of distinction" in
which lawbreakers should be "cast[] out ... by vigorous law enforcement." Angela Harris,
Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 3 (1997).
237 Carbado, supra note 97, at 1040-41.
238 See Mark Peffley et al., Racial Stereotypes and Whites' Political Views of Blacks in
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However, this research also suggests that the effects of negative stereotypes
can be neutralized, at least in the individual case, when stereotypers are
confronted with information about an individual that contradicts their
negative stereotypes. 239 A national random survey of whites regarding their
attitudes towards race, crime and welfare, conducted by Peffley et al.,
provides an example. The researchers found that a significant number of
whites surveyed believed that African Americans were aggressive or violent
and a smaller number believed that they were lazy.240 These negative
stereotypers responded more punitively to policy questions regarding crime
and welfare when the scenario involved African Americans than when the
scenario involved similarly described whites.24  However, this was only
true when African Americans were described in ways that confirmed the
lazy or violent stereotypes.242 When negative stereotypers were given
scenarios in which African Americans were depicted in strongly counter-
stereotypical ways, they responded more favorably to African Americans
then to similarly described whites. 243 The researchers suggest that whites
who hold negative stereotypes of African Americans may simultaneously
adhere to "[p]ositive racial subtypes of especially hardworking or well-
behaved blacks.., with subtypes being reserved for the few exceptions that
'prove the rule.', 24 4
The ACLU's "Driving While Black/Brown" campaign described by
Carbado is an attempt to offer stories that contradict a stereotype of black
criminality. The research of Peffley et al., suggests that such a campaign
may be successful in encouraging stereotyping whites to believe that an
injustice was done in individual cases. The same research, however,
suggests that stories that contradict stereotypes may not change a person's
belief in the general truth of the stereotype. 245 Whether a change in the
the Context of Welfare and Crime, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 30, 31 (1997) (describing social
cognition literature that describes stereotypes as resistant to change).
239 Id. at 52 (describing the results of a national random survey undertaken in 1991 to
assess the political impact of whites' stereotypes of African Americans). See also John
Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role of Racial
Stereotypes, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 375, 380 (1997) (describing the results of a similar research
design in a study of white attitudes in Lexington, Kentucky and finding the same results).
240 Peffley et al., supra note 238, at 35 ("whites agreeing that most blacks are lazy (31%),
irresponsible (20%), aggressive [or violent] (50%), and lacking in discipline (60%)").




245 Id. at 53.
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stereotype occurs is likely to be related, in part, to the frequency with which
246
stereotyping whites are confronted with such counter-stereotype stories.
The second obstacle to changing white consciousness regarding crime
and racial disparities in the criminal justice system is that most whites
understand racism to refer to the intentional conduct of a person who is
motivated by racial hatred.247 Not only must there be a victim-preferably
a worthy or "innocent" victim-but there must also be a villain.24' This
perception means that stories of racial injustice in the criminal justice
system seldom address either systemic privileging of whites over people of
color249 or unconscious racial stereotyping.25 °
While some police and prosecutors operate with intentional racial
malice, many do not. Even in drug enforcement, where there is much
discretion, law enforcement officers and prosecutors may intend to make
choices that are not related to race. So, for example, when a police officer
was shown data that in his district African Americans were much more
frequently targeted for narcotics warrants than were whites or Latinos, he
responded by saying, "we go where the work is.",251 Despite evidence that
race-based stops are less likely to uncover contraband than are stops based
212
on race-neutral factors, some police officers continue to believe that race-
based stops are simply efficient policing.2 53
A narrative that permits a discussion of racism only if there are
intentionally racist police officers or prosecutors, will place whites in a
246 Id. The researchers conclude that "[s]tereotype inhibition requires sufficiently
powerful and plentiful contrary examples so that [stereotyping] whites have enough
anecdotes in their minds that problems such as . . . crime do not immediately and
automatically suggest the involvement of African Americans." Id.
247 RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 11l; Martha Mahoney, Class and Status in American
Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 809 (2003)
("[M]ost whites understand racism as something that a second party does to or believes
about a third party. The second party is the bad racist actor, and the third party the
subordinated person of a minority race-both are distinguished from the way whites
understand themselves.").
248 See Mahoney, supra note 247, at 809. Whites understand racism as something a "bad
racist actor" does to a "person of a minority race-both are distinguished from the way
whites understand themselves." Id.
249 STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE
UNDERMINES AMERICA 12 (1996) ("'Racism' is defined by whites in terms of specific,
discriminatory racist actions by others.").
250 Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (much of racial discrimination will not be
addressed by law that requires proof of intentional acts because racism is often unconscious).
251 Benner, supra note 26, at 200.
252 See Harris, supra note 45, at 82.
253 Id. at 78.
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bind. Most whites reject the idea that they are racist. 254 Therefore, they
must either view these officers and prosecutors as different from
themselves-that is, as "bad racist actors" 255 --or they must conclude that,
because criminal justice actors were not motivated by racial animosity, the
actions were not "racist." If the actions were not "racist," there is no "race
problem."
The third problem for confronting white complacency (or
encouragement) of race disparities in the criminal justice system is the
invisibility (to whites) of white privilege. Whites seldom think of
themselves through the lens of race; whiteness is invisible to most whites.256
Rather, whites see themselves and other whites as individuals. 25 7 Because
they cannot see the privilege that protects them from police maltreatment
and suspicion, they have difficulty believing that such treatment is not in
some way invited or provoked when it happens to others.258 Surveys show
that the majority of whites do not believe that African Americans receive
harsher treatment in the criminal justice system,259 and when asked about
their local police officers, large majorities of whites express confidence in
the ability of local police to treat African Americans and whites equally. 260
Of course, white privilege does not render every white immune from
police mistreatment or suspicion. There are whites whose presence is
considered suspect by "respectable" whites. "Respectability" allows whites
to avoid this categorization, however. As a number of racial profiling
incidents illustrate, respectability does not offer similar protection for
African American individuals.261  In fact, research finds that socio-
254 See Wildman, supra note 249, at II ("[C]alling someone a racist ... lays the blame
on the individual rather than the systemic forces that have shaped that individual and his or
her society. White people ... become concerned with how to avoid [the racist] ... label,
rather than worrying about systemic racism ... .
255 Mahoney, supra note 247, at 809.
256 See generally BARBARA J. FLAGG, WHITE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW: WAS BLIND
BUT Now I SEE (1998); Wildman, supra note 249.
257 See Mahoney, supra note 247, at 810 (describing the way affirmative action programs
"change[] the transparent quality of whiteness" by forcing whites to "identify as white rather
than as individuals with no race.").
258 See, e.g., Taslitz supra note 6, at 278-79 (Whites who believe in black criminality
may believe that illegal stops of African Americans are the fault of African Americans and if
they consider the person stopped to be "blameworthy," they may react with anger towards
the victim of the racial stop.).
259 See, e.g., Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race, Class, and Perceptions of
Discrimination of Police, 45 CRIME & DELENQ. 494, 498 (1999).
260 Id.
261 See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 97, at 1043 (noting that the politics of respectability
does not protect "good" blacks).
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economic status does not insulate African Americans from racial
profiling.262 Color "trumps" respectability.
There are many efforts underway to change the race disparities in the
criminal justice system. In the next section I examine the potential of the
growing "Innocence Movement" to act as a vehicle for shifting white
perceptions in ways that encourage whites to challenge the differential
treatment of African Americans and Latinos in the criminal justice system.
The Innocence Movement is not generally understood to focus on racial
injustice, but I argue that while the movement has limitations, it can
nevertheless be harnessed as an effective vehicle for pursuing a racial
justice agenda.
B. THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT
When I speak of "The Innocence Movement" I refer to the work of
lawyers and non-lawyers on behalf of persons convicted of crimes they did
not commit. Religious organizations, attorneys and scholars have pursued
this work for some time, but the momentum giving rise to over 136
exonerations 263 can be traced largely to the work of the Innocence Project
begun by Berry Scheck and Peter Neufeld at Cardozo Law School.264 The
Innocence Network, initiated by Cardozo and Northwestern law schools,
265
is a network of projects in thirty one states,266 involving law schools as well
267
as individual attorneys.
262 Weitzer & Tuch, supra note 259, at 503 (noting that research finds that four out of
ten African Americans, irrespective of middle-class status, had personal experience of police
mistreatment, while very few whites had such experiences).
263 See Cardozo Innocence Project at http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Oct.
14, 2003). Others proffer much higher numbers. See, e.g., Website of Dr. Edmund Higgins
at http://www.dredmundhiggins.com/database.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) (database of
all wrongful convictions in Canada and U.S.; includes 316 cases).
264 See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 71, at 323 for a description of the origin of this project.
265 Id. at 323.
266 The network is "a group of law schools, journalism schools, and public defender
offices across the country that assists inmates trying to prove their innocence ....
http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/index.php. The Innocence Project at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/other__projects.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2003)
(listing the projects by state).
267 Id. Many law schools have adopted innocence projects. See, e.g., Cardozo Innocence
Project, supra note 263 (recently achieving its 138th exoneration); Innocence Project New
Orleans at http://www.ip-no.org/index.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2003); Innocence Project of
the National Capital Region at http://www.wcl.american.edu/innocenceproject/ (last visited
Oct. 14, 2003); The North Carolina Center on Actual Innocence at http://www.law.duke.edu/
innocencecenter/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2003). Notable individuals have appeared publicly to
talk about the problem of wrongful convictions and to urge prosecutorial reform to prevent
such occurrences. See Press Release, The Plight of the Wrongfully Convicted Takes Center
DONNA COKER
The movement has had an impact on shaping public awareness of the
fallibility of the criminal justice system. This public recognition has likely
had the most significant impact on destabilizing support for the death
penalty. This effect can be seen from the mass commutations made by
former Governor George Ryan of Illinois, 268 to the Supreme Court's recent
decision that it is unconstitutional to execute mentally retarded
individuals, 269 to the introduction of federal legislation for a moratorium on
federal death penalty prosecutions.
270
In 2000, Scheck and Neufeld analyzed seventy-four exoneration cases.
In each of these cases, DNA evidence cleared the person initially convicted
of the crime.27 Scheck and Neufeld determined that the following factors
contributed to wrongful convictions in those cases: mistaken eyewitness
testimony (82%); police misconduct (50%); prosecutorial misconduct
(45%); inadequate defense counsel (32%); false confessions (22%); snitches
Stage at the University of Miami, available at http://www.wrongfulconvictions.com/
releases.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
268 See Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University College [sic] of Law
(Jan. 11, 2003) available at http://www.cuadp.org/20030111ryan.html (noting the
importance of the work of those working to exonerate innocent prisoners, as well as the work
of individuals who represent those charged with capital offenses).
269 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Court noted that mentally retarded
individuals may be at greater risk of wrongful conviction because they are more likely to
make false confessions and are unable to assist their counsel. Id. at 320-21. This point was
argued by a number of amici as well as the defendant. See Brief of Amici Curiae of the
A.B.A. in Support of Petitioner at 14, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452)
[hereinafter "ABA brief"] (describing cases of mentally retarded individuals convicted and
sentenced to die for crimes they did not commit); Brief of Amici Curiae of the Am. Civil
Liberties Union, et al., at 2, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452)
[hereinafter "ACLU Brief"] ("the unique challenges presented by death penalty cases
involving persons with mental retardation have resulted in serious obstacles to fair . . .
treatment for this class of imprisoned people who are at special risk of unjust punishment").
Amici highlighted the stories of Earl Washington and Anthony Porter, two mentally retarded
prisoners convicted of capital crimes, who were later exonerated. ACLU Brief at 7-8, Atkins
(No. 00-8452); ABA Brief at 14-15, Atkins (No. 00-8452). Washington was sentenced to
death in Virginia based on his confession, but was later cleared by DNA evidence. ACLU
Brief at 7, Atkins (No. 00-8452). Porter was within days of being executed when journalism
students at Northwestern conclusively demonstrated that he had not committed the crime.
Jon Jeter, A New Ending to an Old Story: Journalism Students Rewrite the Case of an
Innocent Man Set to Die, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1999, at CO. Erwin Chemerinsky points
out that Atkins "is the first Supreme Court case that has paid a great deal of attention to the
need to administer the death penalty in a manner that minimizes the likelihood of executing
an innocent person." Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court Review, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 269,
274 (2003).
270 The National Death Penalty Moratorium Act of 2001, S. 233, 107th Cong. (2001).
The Act was introduced by Senator Russell Feingold.
271 SCHECK ET AL., supra note 71, at 318.
[Vol. 93
2003] FOREWORD: REAL WORLD OF RACIAL INJUSTICE 873
or informants (19%).272 In addition, one third "involved tainted or
fraudulent science." 273  Scheck and Neufeld conclude that "[a]mong the
more troubling findings is that several of these factors are more pronounced
in the conviction of innocent black men.,
274
Many of the widely publicized cases of wrongful conviction involved
African American inmates.275  The Innocence Project's review of
exonerations in 2000 found that fifty-five percent of exoneration cases
involving sexual assaults or murders involved African American male
defendants and white victims. 276 This rate is four times the rate at which
African Americans are charged with killing or raping white victims, 2
77
suggesting that these kinds of cases may be particularly prone to wrongful
conviction.
Despite these facts, and the fact that one chapter of Scheck and
Neufeld's book is devoted to "race" as a cause of wrongful conviction, little
of the public awareness of the Innocence Movement or of the exoneration
cases focuses on racism as a central cause of conviction of the innocent.278
Bryan Stevenson argues that the tolerance of race bias in the operation of
the criminal law increases the risk of wrongful convictions for African
Americans suspected or accused of crime. 279  He also argues that the
significant racial disparities in drug arrests has fueled the "presumption of





275 See, e.g., Frontline, Requiem for Frank Lee Smith at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/smith/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) (describing the case of a Florida
inmate exonerated by DNA after his death in prison of cancer); SCHECK ET AL., supra note
71.
171 SCHECK, ET AL., supra note 71, at 265.
277 id.
278 A few scholars have examined the effect of race as a cause of wrongful conviction.
See, e.g., Karen F. Parker et al., Race, the Death Penalty and Wrongful Convictions, 18
CRIM. JUST. 49, 49-51 (2003) (recounting research findings that African Americans are more
likely to be wrongly convicted); see generally Arthur L. Rizer III, The Race Effect on
Wrongful Convictions, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 845 (2003).
279 Bryan Stevenson, Transcript of Innocence and Race, Lecture Recorded for Innocence
Project at 5, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/course.php (DVD and
transcript available from website) [hereinafter Stevenson Transcript]. The Innocence
Project, the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University, and The Innocence
Network, developed a wrongful conviction course. Stevenson's lecture is one of thirteen
lectures recorded on CDs for use in the course. Stevenson is one of the lecturers. See also
Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Freedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of
Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509 (1994).
280 Stevenson Transcript, supra note 279, at 6.
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Activists have argued for a number of reforms designed to address the
list of problems that give rise to wrongful convictions. Many, if not all, of
these reforms would benefit, and benefit disproportionately, African
Americans.2 81  For example, cross-racial identifications are particularly
unreliable. 282 The recommendation by Innocent Movement activists that
identification lineups or photos be done sequentially rather than
simultaneously, 283 if adopted, would likely decrease the chance that a white
witness will misidentify an African American suspect simply because "they
all look alike." Similarly, the recommendation that to avoid false or
coerced confessions, all interrogations be videotaped or at least audio
taped,284 may diminish the use of coercive police techniques and physical
torture, tactics reported by a number of African American exonerees.
Reform recommendations aimed at making police and prosecutor decisions
more public and more open to scrutiny, if adopted, would benefit individual
African Americans suspected of criminal activity by diminishing police and
prosecutor misconduct.285 The recommendations for increasing the quality
of criminal defense representation for the poor-increased funding,
reasonable case loads, adequate training and appropriate standards of
competency-would assist African Americans charged with criminal
offenses, who are disproportionately low-income.286
281 Many of the widely publicized cases of wrongful conviction involved African
American prisoners. See, e.g., Frontline, The Case for Innocence at http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) (discussing wrongful
convictions, including the case of Earl Washington, broadcast in the documentary aired on
Public Broadcasting Network); SCHECK ET AL., supra note 71, at 339-40 (describing the
Washington case).
282 ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 136-42 (1979) (noting that subjects
recognized members of their own race more easily than members of a different race).
Several of the exonerations involved cross-racial identifications. See SCHECK ET AL., supra
note 71, at 255 (describing the case of Calvin Johnson, an African American convicted of
rape of a white woman for whom DNA evidence later exonerated; Johnson was identified in
a photo lineup by a white rape victim).
283 See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 71, at 351-52.
284 Id. at 352.
285 See, e.g., SCHECK ET AL., supra note 71, at 353-54 (urging use of independent crime
labs); id. at 355 (urging development of separate disciplinary committees to deal exclusively
with allegations of prosecutorial and police misconduct); id. at 357 (urging the
establishment of innocence commissions). As David Cole notes, the current system operates
with a formal norm of transparency, but with a hidden norm of secrecy. COLE, supra note 8,
at 186.
286 See generally Stephen G. Bright, Glimpses at a Dream Yet to be Realized, CHAMPION,
Mar. 22, 1998, at 12 (noting that representation for poor criminal defendants is often
inadequate).
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Though this list of reforms would assist individual African Americans
suspected or accused of a crime, the list does not include reforms that
explicitly address the manner in which racial stereotypes lead to the
conviction of the innocent. Stevenson argues that students and lawyers
working for innocence projects must confront the impact of race on
287
wrongful convictions.. He concludes that this requires "a broader vision
of what equal justice requires" 288 then improving forensic science or
increasing access to competent counsel.289
There are at least three ways in which the Innocence Movement may
be useful as a vehicle for changing white perceptions regarding crime, black
criminality, and the criminal justice system. First, by challenging white
faith in the fairness and accuracy of the criminal justice system, the
movement challenges the belief that those whom criminal justice actors
suspect or mistreat deserved or provoked such treatment. Exoneration
stories often involve individuals with criminal histories and thus illustrate
the problem with presuming guilt on the basis of criminal history or
unrespectable" appearance. 29  They do not tell the narrative of "bad"
officer and "good" African American individual that Carbado describes in
the Driving While Black/Brown campaign literature. 291 Therefore, these
narratives about exonerees have the potential to demonstrate the harms that
racist practices create for those who are not "angels. 292
The second way in which the Innocence Movement may help to
change white perceptions is to challenge presumptions of black criminality.
Exoneration cases present an alternative explanation for racial disparities in
arrest and sentencing. Exoneration cases suggest that some of this disparity
is due to police or prosecutorial misconduct, rather than to racial differences
in rates of offending.
Finally, a focus on the cases of police and prosecutorial misconduct
leading to the conviction of the innocent, may provide a way of talking
about the harms that flow from misconduct in the cases of the "guilty." The
accused who receives a longer sentence because the officer lied is no less
the victim of misconduct than the person who did not commit a crime at all.
287 Stevenson Transcript, supra note 279, at 13.
288 id.
289 Id.
290 See, e.g., Jeter, supra note 269 (describing the exoneration of Porter, noting that when
Porter was arrested for the homicide he had been arrested nearly two dozen times and
convicted of armed robbery).
291 See Carbado, supra note 97, at 1038.
292 Jeter, supra note 269 (referring to Porter, exonerated in a homicide; Jeter notes that
Porter "was no angel").
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Despite these potential uses of the Innocence Movement, there are
several possible limitations. The Innocence Movement discourse focuses
on individual bad actors-police officers or prosecutors who engage in
misconduct and forensic experts who lie. This discourse is not focused on
systemic questions regarding law enforcement priorities: where to
concentrate enforcement efforts; who should be the focus of search
warrants; who should be charged; and what charges should be brought. As
described earlier, these questions are key in challenging racial disparities in
drug enforcement arrests. In addition, a focus on innocence may detract
from the injustices that are routinely visited on the "guilty." 293 The focus
on the few who can demonstrate actual innocence should indict the entire
system, but not surprisingly, we hear defenders of the system declare that
the increased availability of DNA evidence and the fact that mistakes have
been found means that the criminal system is working!294 In fact, in a
number of cases, prosecutors continued to oppose the release of individuals
295whom DNA evidence proved did not commit the crime.
Another limitation of the Innocence Movement may be the lack of
emphasis placed on the mental state of the accused. Criminal responsibility
generally requires both that an individual engage in the conduct prohibited
by law (or assist another in so doing) and that the person have the requisite
mental state (the mens rea) that renders it fair to hold him or her
accountable for the conduct.
Innocence discourse, like innocence cases, tends to focus on actus reus
questions. The claim, by its nature, is almost always one of mistaken
identity: I did not do the act for which I am accused. A focus that equates
"innocence" with not having engaged in the proscribed conduct may
encourage the public to view mental states as mere technicalities unrelated
to real innocence. Yet, the effect of racism may be profound in those cases
that turn on mens rea questions. For example, research suggests that whites
are more likely to view African American defendants as dangerous and
violent than they view white defendants.296 If this is the case, we would
293 See generally David Feige, The Dark Side of Innocence, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 15,
1993, at 15.
294 See, e.g., Martin J. Oberman & Kathleen L. Roach, Justice Denied, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
1, 1997, at 21. Illinois Governor Jim Edgar, in response to seven exonerations among death
row inmates, described the exonerations as the justice system working as it should. Id.
295 See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 71.
296 See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officers's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1325
(2002). Subjects who were asked to shoot a video image if the person displayed was
carrying a gun, "use[d] ethnicity to interpret an ambiguously threatening target" resulting in
more accurate targeting of African Americans when the decision was to shoot and more
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expect that white jurors are more likely to disbelieve claims of African
Americans that depend on proving that the defendant was fearful or
coerced-mental states necessary for self-defense and duress.
Presumptions of black criminality may also encourage white jurors to doubt
the veracity of testimony that contradicts racial stereotypes. So, we might
expect white jurors to disbelieve African American defendants who claim
they did not enter into a criminal agreement or that they did not intend to
assist another individual to commit a crime. Further, in cases where an
African American man is charged with a sexual offense against a white
woman, white jurors may be less inclined to believe a defendant's
testimony that the woman consented to sexual relations.
Finally, a focus on the "innocent" may minimize the importance of
official misconduct in the cases where the defendant may be guilty of a
lesser crime than the one for which he was convicted. Some research finds
racial effects in sentencing: African American defendants receive longer
sentences than do whites who are convicted of the same crime and who
have similar criminal histories.297 These cases of "over-incarceration" or
"wrongful sentencing" create real harms for individuals, families, and
communities,298 but a focus on innocence may make these harms appear
less important.
accurate decisions not to shoot for white targets. Id.
297 See David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing:
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & EcON. 285, 311-12 (2001). A study of
federal sentencing comparing African American, Hispanic, and white defendants who were
sentenced in the same district, committed the same offense, and had the same criminal
history and offense level. Id. at 300. The study found that African American and male
defendants receive longer sentences than do whites for the same crime, are less likely to
receive no prison term when that option is available, are more likely to receive upward
departures, and less likely to receive downward departures. Id. at 311-12. See also Cassia
C. Spohn, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral Sentencing
Process, in 3 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND DECISIONS OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 427, 443 (2000) available at http://www.ncjrs.org/
criminal justice2000/vol_3/03front.pdf. Spohn reviewed more than forty recent studies on
race and sentencing and concluded:
Black and Hispanic offenders-and particularly those who are young, male, or unemployed-are
more likely than their white counterparts to be sentenced to prison; they also may receive longer
sentences that similarly situated white offenders. Other categories of racial minorities-those
convicted of drug offenses, those who victimize whites, those who accumulate more serious
prior criminal records, or those who refuse to plead guilty or are unable to secure pretrial
release-also may be singled out for more punitive punishment.
Id. at 481.




Former Illinois Governor George Ryan described his decision to
commute the sentences of all death row inmates in Illinois in the following
way:
I started with this issue concerned about innocence. But once I studied, once I
pondered what had become of our justice system, I came to care above all about
fairness .... The facts I have seen in reviewing each and every one of these cases
raised questions not only about the innocence of people on death row, but about the
fairness of the death penalty system as a whole.
299
Ryan's change in perception offers hope that the Innocence Movement can
expand whites' perceptions of racial injustice to move from a concern about
"innocence" to a concern about "fairness."
Justice Kennedy's address to the American Bar Association300 this
summer was both an encouraging and a frustrating sign. Kennedy declared
that "[o]ur resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our
sentences too long." 0'0 It was encouraging to hear a Justice of the Supreme
Court address the issue of massive incarceration as well as the racial
disparities in incarcerated persons.30 2 Kennedy deplored the cost of such
massive incarceration both in terms of money spent and in terms of human
suffering.30 3  He criticized federal sentencing guidelines and federal
mandatory minimum sentences 304 for the increase in incarceration and for
placing too much discretion in the hands of prosecutors.305 He urged the
Bar to "help start a new public discussion about the prison system[,] ' 30 6 to
urge repeal of mandatory minimums,30 7 and to recommend that the pardon
process be "reinvigorated. 30 8
But Kennedy's speech was frustrating for its restatement of the Court's
view with regard to the many constitutional challenges, including those that
299 Ryan Address, supra note 268.
300 Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Address at the A.B.A. Association Annual Meeting
(August 9, 2003) available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-
09-03.html (Revised Aug. 14, 2003).
301 Id.
302 Id. (noting that of the 2.1 million people who are incarcerated in the U.S., forty
percent of those in prisons are African American, ten percent of African American men in
their mid-to-late twenties are behind bars, and "[i]n some cities more than 50% of young
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allege racial bias, to the actions of criminal justice personnel: "[i]t is a grave
mistake to retain a policy because a court finds it unconstitutional .... A
court decision does not excuse the political branches or the public from the
responsibility for unjust laws. 30 9
The Supreme Court is unlikely to be moved to action by increasing
evidence of racial disparities or evidence of the harms of those disparities.
The democratic process seems the primary avenue available for changing
law enforcement priorities that reflect and maintain "seeing crime in shades
of Black., 310 Political support for change requires, in part, addressing white
complacency and support for racial injustice in the criminal justice system.
In this effort, the Innocence Movement may play a useful role, but only if
the discourse of the movement engages race directly as both a source of
wrongful conviction and as a source of "over incarceration" or "wrongful
sentencing."
309 id.
310 RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 110 ("A person would have to live as a hermit to avoid
seeing crime portrayed in shades of Black.").
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